No Respite From Fear
The unexploded bomb found on Thursday near a market in Chiang Mai, just as people all around the country celebrated Queen Sirikit's birthday, marks the latest episode in Thailand's six-month-old season of "fear and folly" – a campaign of bombings and sabotage as enigmatic as it is frightening.
The government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has given the Thai people an easy outlet for their fears: blame the Red Shirts. Just on July 30, the Department of Special Investigations submitted to the Office of the Attorney General a request to indict twenty-four core leaders of the UDD, as well as former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, on charges of "terrorism." On August 11, as expected, the Attorney General indicted nineteen of them, all of whom are in custody, and delayed its decision on the six who remain at large. The government alleges that the UDD leaders either approved or planned operations that include: 1) A string of grenade attacks on over seventy locations in Bangkok and other provinces; 2) The actions of the so-called "men-in-black" on April 10, which resulted in the death of a handful of soldiers; 3) The arson of more than three dozen buildings on May 19. All face possible death sentences if eventually convicted.
The government has ignored our repeated requests to review the evidence upon which the terrorism cases are built – and conduct our own examination as required by international law. In addition, the "evidence" that has been given to the public about the premeditated nature of these acts of terrorism and their connection with the UDD leaders remains laughably weak – thus far, all the government has been able to offer are two speeches given back in January by UDD leaders Nattawut Saikua and Arisman Pongruangrong, in which the speakers warned of retaliation in the event of a military coup (in Nattawut's case) or use of force against the Red Shirts (in Arisman's case). With regard to Dr. Thaksin, prominent government officials accused the former Prime Minister of providing financial support for the attacks, alleging that at least a few were committed at his behest for the purpose of sabotaging any agreement on the so-called "roadmap for reconciliation," but have failed to support these inflammatory statements with any actual facts.
Considering the aggressiveness that the government has demonstrated in disseminating information that supports its account of the tragic events of April and May, we must conclude from its refusal to provide the defense team or the public with any hard evidence of the UDD leaders' involvement that the charges it has filed are entirely political – in fact, that the accusations of "terrorism" amount to nothing other than a underhanded media campaign against the Red Shirts supported by the actions of politicized investigators and a notoriously pliant judicial system.
In these times, branding someone a "terrorist" is an effective way to publicly discredit a suspect regardless of his or her actual guilt – much like accusing someone of being a "communist" was in the 1970s. Indeed, the media campaign launched by the government and the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) to portray the Red Shirt movement as a "terrorist" organization, especially in the wake of the clashes on April 10, went a long way towards legitimizing the subsequent dispersal operations, despite the unacceptable loss of life. In fact, labeling the Red Shirts "terrorists" was so instrumental to the government's ability to censor all alternative sources of information, suspend constitutional rights, and crack down on the Red Shirts without triggering an angry backlash by the citizens of Bangkok that we are increasingly concerned about the possibility that some of the violent attacks may have been staged by factions within Thailand's armed forces (or the ultra-nationalist groups that the government has consistently proven unable to rein in) for the purpose of cooking up a damaging public case against the Red Shirts – in other words, that some of the episodes of violence might fit into a "strategy of tension" designed to justify the government's continued recourse to emergency powers and draconian restrictions on the rights of the opposition (we have seen this past weekend that the restrictions do not apply to those with government-approved views).
Our suspicions are grounded in three simple observations.
First, we are skeptical of the nature of the evidence that the government has been able to present to the public. Aside from the fact that no evidence has emerged to corroborate the involvement of UDD leaders in these acts of "terrorism," serious doubts persist about the affiliations of those who carried out many of the violent attacks the government has attributed to the Red Shirts by default. Most of the bombings and shootings that have taken place since February remain unresolved, no arrest having been made. In some cases, the police quickly apprehended suspects and then released them for lack of evidence. In the rare instances where the alleged perpetrators were arrested and explicitly linked to the UDD, moreover, the government's investigation yielded questionable findings. The Rocket-Propelled Grenade that hit near the Defense Ministry on March 20, for instance, was said to have been aimed at the Temple of the Emerald Buddha. Since the sensational announcement of the suspect's "confession," however, no further details have emerged about the plot. Furthermore, strangely enough two of the suspects apprehended by Cambodian police in connection with the bomb at Bhum Jai Thai headquarters were reportedly given up by Red Shirts who are in hiding there, including former MP Payap Panket. Curiously, the Cambodian government returned these suspects (whom the Thai government professed not knowing had traveled to Cambodia as of July 1) but never handed over any of the actual Red Shirts who are believed to have taken shelter across the border.
Whereas the Abhisit government is especially quick to label its opponents "terrorists," it has done a rather poor job of substantiating these claims. In fact, as it is typically the case in countries where the judicial process is rigged, investigators freely admit that their investigative agency is a "political tool," and the findings of experts the government employs are predetermined by partisan affiliation, the point of these inquiries was never to find out the truth. The purpose of these criminal prosecutions is rather to lend some legitimacy to the government's media campaign and perhaps keep the UDD leaders in prison as long as possible ? whether or not the investigations uncover any of the facts is besides the point. This is rather consistent with many other aspects of Thai politics, where constitutional/legal processes serve either as sideshow or smokescreen, while most decisions of any consequence are made elsewhere.
Second, the timing of the attacks is interesting to say the least. Victimless explosions at four Bangkok Bank branches on the night of February 27 led to vague but stern warnings issued by the government that more "sabotage" was planned in the lead-up to March 14, thereby justifying the imposition of the Internal Security Act. The surge in attacks observed during the last week of March was highly instrumental to the imposition of the Emergency Decree on April 8, in anticipation of the April 10 crackdown. Then, the explosions that rocked Bangkok in late April set the stage for the assassination of Seh Daeng and the bloodshed that accompanied the weeklong push to disperse the Red Shirt rallies, while the fires on May 19 gave the government enough cover to sweep the dead bodies of ninety Red Shirts under the rug. More than a month later, the bomb at the BJT headquarters muted the intensifying calls to lift the Emergency Decree, leading to the three-month extension handed down on July 6. Then, on July 25, just hours after Abhisit announced to the press that the government would urgently consider lifting the emergency decree, a bomb went off at Big C Rajadamri, killing one man and putting any plans to restore the people's constitutional rights on hold for some more time to come.
These may well be simple coincidences, but the fact remains that terrorist attacks have tended to occur at rather convenient times for the government's purposes. It is also interesting that "terrorists" always seem to confirm what the government wants the public to believe. First it was that the Red Shirt rallies could not be properly contained without the Internal Security Act. Then it was to show that the Internal Security Act was itself not enough. Then it was that the Red Shirts needed to be put down whatever the cost. And then it was to point out that those who ended up dead got what they deserved. Considering that the Red Shirts were desperate to earn the support of Bangkok residents, more than any others these "terrorists" helped the government show that the UDD deserved none of that public support. One might say that the "terrorists" were the government's best allies; were it not for the "terrorists," it is quite likely that this government would no longer be in office. Indeed, "terrorists" have rescued Abhisit from almost certain oblivion enough times to make us wonder whether that might in fact have been their objective.
Third, the conduct of the Thai government since the Red Shirt demonstrations were dispersed on May 19 strikes us as the behavior of a group of people who have much to hide. Censorship prevents broad public debate about the government's account of the events, while friendly media outlets continue to repeat the official version with great enthusiasm. The government's refusal to conduct an independent investigation into the violence suggests an incipient cover-up designed to guarantee the impunity of civilian and military leaders, while the establishment of two separate judicial systems – an unforgiving, abrupt system for the Red Shirts; an overindulgent, sluggish system for their counterparts in Yellow – reflects rather poorly on the government's commitment to justice and the rule of law. Finally, the defensiveness of government spokesmen, whose reaction to being challenged on the facts consists exclusively of racist epithets and ad hominem attacks, suggests a certain anxiety to avoid discussing more inconvenient aspects of the situation. Silencing critics, suppressing evidence, and personalizing the debate are not the weapons of choice of those who have nothing to hide.
For these reasons, it isn't much of a stretch to believe that a government with this track-record of violence, abuse of power, and misinformation could have staged a few incidents ? consisting mostly of loud bangs and broken windows – to justify (or divert attention from) its track record of violence, abuse of power, and misinformation.
It would not be the first time this happens in Thailand. "Third hands" are known to have been at play during both the 1973 and 1992 protests, when organized agents provocateur sparked riots that provided the authorities with the pretext to crack down. More recently, pro-government "Blue Shirts" attempted to precipitate a confrontation by attacking Red Shirts who were demonstrating in Pattaya in April 2009.
The most important precedent for a prolonged "strategy of tension," however, is the campaign of violence carried out by the state and state-sanctioned civilian vigilantes in an attempt to undermine the elected governments of the mid-1970s. In the build-up to the 1976 elections, officially endorsed, state-funded groups like the Village Scouts, Nawaphon, and the Red Gaurs are known to have engaged in a protracted campaign of extra-judicial executions against purported communists, provincial politicians, and rural activists such as those working for the Farmers Federation of Thailand. The same groups were also responsible for violent clashes with students and workers, for inciting ethnic riots against the Vietnamese community in the Northeast, and for violent bombings that killed scores of people at campaign rallies all over the country. The violence created a climate of instability and fear that in turn set the stage for the carnage of October 6, 1976. Hordes of civilian vigilantes, rallied to the capital city to defend Thailand from "communists" (who, among other things, were accused of planning to burn down Wat Boworniwet), surrounded the campus of Thammasat University and carried out a horrific massacre. The 1970s campaign of violence completely undermined the public's confidence in the democratic process. The crackdown of the students sparked no backlash in Bangkok, while the military coup that followed reportedly came as a relief to much of the urban population.
It should not be lost on anyone that some of the architects and financial backers of Thailand's 1970s "strategy of tension" now rank among Abhisit's strongest supporters.
According to Thai law, acts of violence may amount to the crime of "terrorism" if the intent is either to compel the government to undertake a certain course of action or to cause disorder by creating fear among the public. Over the past six months, the government has scarcely missed an opportunity to terrify the residents of Bangkok about the danger posed by the Red Shirts. It has then exploited the people's fear to exercise wide-ranging powers that normal circumstances would never have warranted, short of staging a coup. In light of Thailand's long history of sabotage, "third hands," and "strategies of tension," we are increasingly concerned about the possibility that some of the real "terrorists" (whether or not they operate with the approval of the civilian leadership) are individuals who work for the state. Extra-parliamentary groups like the People's Alliance for Democracy, a fierce critic of liberal democracy, have consistently attempted to spark a violent confrontation with the Red Shirts and have repeatedly humiliated the Prime Minister by flaunting regulations Abhisit has no power to enforce on groups with friends in such high places. Right-wing factions of the military, moreover, have an interest – financial and otherwise – in weakening the civilian government, in justifying a continued political role, and in continuing to exercise the powers that the State of Emergency vests in the armed forces.
In the interest of bringing real "terrorists" to justice, the government must heed the call issued by virtually every human rights organization around the world and allow the kind of independent and complete investigation that international law mandates. Further, Mr. Abhisit must lift the state of emergency, which currently remains in effect for the sole purpose of sparing the government and the military men who support it the hassle of adhering to a constitution they themselves wrote. Notwithstanding the gravity of the crisis that Thailand is currently undergoing, democratic countries the world over have endured far worse seasons of violence and upheaval without turning to the extreme measures the Thai government has taken. The government's eagerness to invoke such measures – and its reluctance to lift them – speaks more about the tenuousness of its position than it does about the seriousness of the situation. Whoever the "terrorists" are, the recourse to emergency powers gives them a victory they do not deserve. We hope that was not the plan all along.
Photo credit: Thai forensic policeman inspects the site of a bomb attack near a bus station outside a Big C shopping mall in Bangkok July 25, 2010. REUTERS/Chaiwat Subprasom
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