Thailand's Latin-Style Junta
In a surreal interview given to AsiaTimes Online, Abhisit Vejjajiva recently insisted that the Thai military is under civilian control. Even for a Prime Minister whose detachment from reality is legendary, this statement is extraordinarily imaginative. Considering that he owes his job to the generals, the Prime Minister should know better. Indeed, the lack of civilian control over the military is highlighted not only by the continued existence of CRES, but also the daily windbaggery of General Prayuth Chan-ocha. Unlike his predecessor, General Prayuth finds it hard to resist the temptation of constantly reminding everyone that he is running the show.
The reality is that the Thai military rarely has been under civilian control. What is worse, the generalshave more power today than they have had in decades. Having staged more coups than any modern army, the Thai military's views still figure into every political calculus. And while its budget has more than doubled since the 2006 coup, the events of April and May have shown that its competence and commitment to democratic values are beyond the pale of analysis. If Thailand is ever to become a democracy, that must change. In a real democracy, most citizens have no idea who the army chief is — much less are they confronted with the possibility of a coup and the army chief's bloviations on a daily basis.
We are certainly not the first to point out that the Thai military does not function as instrument of external defense, but rather as a private guard that protects Thailand's Establishment (which includes prominent generals) from the people's democratic aspirations. This position confers upon the military the ultimate veto role in Thailand's network of political power.
While the Establishment has made a habit out of portraying itself and its dominance of the political system as a product of "Thainess," on this count its workings are anything but uniquely Thai. In fact, the Thai armed forces are genetically related to brutal military leadership of countries like Brazil, Chile, and Argentina during the 1970s and early 1980s. In his book Militarization, Democracy, and Development, Kirk Bowman describes Latin American militaries in these terms:
First, there is a long and enduring tradition of Latin American security forces exhibiting an almost spiritual calling to protect the citizens of the Patria [the "fatherland"] from progressive values and to reinforce traditional conservative values […] Latin American militaries have a long tradition of internal focus and self-appointed and often constitutionally sanctioned authority to override civilian governments, human rights, and political rights if the Patria is perceived to be threatened.
Second, Latin America has been strongly affected by the actions and policies of the United States […], [which] really turned up the pressure for Latin American armies to fight internal enemies.
Third, […] countries with challenging internal threat environments and limited external threats will have weak civilian institutions, weak state capacity, and an inward-oriented military with a proclivity to seize political power.
Bowman's words should sound familiar to observers of Thai politics. Much like the caudillos of Latin American armies, the Thai military has never shied away from human rights violations, massacres, and military takeovers when democracy threatened the Establishment and the conservative interests it embodies. Thanks to American support and the existence of limited external threats, over the past several decades the Thai military has wholly dedicated itself to maximizing its own power and budget at the expense of the rule of law, civilian institutions, state capacity, and the Thai people's freedoms.
The difference is that while countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (to say nothing of South Korea and Taiwan) have been under civilian control for two decades or more — Brazil recently elected a former guerrilla who suffered torture at the hands of the army in the 1970s— Thailand's military is as strong, meddlesome, and brutal as ever. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly difficult to imagine Thailand's future as a democratic, developed nation so long as an organization so powerful, so corrupt, and so eager to turn its guns against its own people continues to exist.
Ultimately, disbanding the armed forces entirely — following the example set by countries like Costa Rica and, more recently, Panama — may prove easier that attempting to reform an institution that is so doggedly committed to the cause of preventing Thailand from ever becoming a normal country.
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