CHICAGO REDSHIRTS FOR DEMOCRACY: Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/sites/default/files/B121-%20Thailand-%20The%20Calm%20Before%20Another%20Storm.pdf

Update Briefing

Asia Briefing N°121

Bangkok/Brussels, 11 April 2011

Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

I. OVERVIEW

Nearly a year after the crackdown on anti-establishment

demonstrations, Thailand is preparing for a general election.

Despite government efforts to suppress the Red Shirt movement, support remains strong and the deep political divide

has not gone away. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva's roadmap for reconciliation has led almost nowhere. Although

there have been amateurish bomb attacks carried out by

angry Red Shirts since the crackdown, fears of an underground battle have not materialised. On the other side, the

Yellow Shirts have stepped up their nationalist campaigns

against the Democrat Party-led government that their earlier

rallies had helped bring to power. They are now claiming

elections are useless in "dirty" politics and urging Thais to

refuse to vote for any of the political parties. Even if the

elections are free, fair and peaceful, it will still be a challenge for all sides to accept the results. If another coalition is

pushed together under pressure from the royalist establishment, it will be a rallying cry for renewed mass protests

by the Red Shirts that could plunge Thailand into more

violent confrontation.

The Red Shirt demonstrations in March-May 2010 sparked

the most deadly clashes between protestors and the state in

modern Thai history and killed 92 people. The use of

force by the government may have weakened the Red Shirts

but the movement has not been dismantled and is still

supported by millions of people, particularly in the North

and North East. Arresting their leaders as well as shutting

down their media and channels of communication has only

reinforced their sense of injustice. Some in the movement's

hardline fringe have chosen to retaliate with violence but

the leadership has reaffirmed its commitment to peaceful

political struggle. The next battle will be waged through

ballot boxes and the Red Shirts will throw their weight

behind their electoral wing, the Pheu Thai Party.

The protracted struggle between supporters of the elite establishment – the monarchy, the military and the judiciary – and

those allied with ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra

began with the formation of the "yellow-shirted" People's

Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in 2006. The September

2006 coup removed Thaksin from power but prompted the

emergence of a counter movement: the United Front for

Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) or Red Shirts. The

PAD's campaigns to close down Bangkok airports in 2008

created deadlock that was resolved by a court ruling that removed Thaksin's "proxy" party – People Power Party – from

power. This led to the formation of the Democrat-led coalition government, backed by the military. Two years later,

the ultra-nationalist Yellow Shirts have apparently split

from their former allies and are protesting outside Government House against Abhisit's alleged failure to defend

"Thai territory" in the Preah Vihear border dispute with

Cambodia. The PAD's call for a "virtuous" leader to replace

the prime minister has raised concerns that it is inviting the

military to stage a coup.

Abhisit has stated he will dissolve parliament in the first

week of May after expediting the enactment of legislation to

revise key electoral rules. He is moving quickly towards the

elections amid rumours of a coup. With the new rules and

pre-poll largesse, the Democrat Party hopes to secure

more seats and position itself to lead another coalition.

Thaksin is still popular with much of the electorate and

there is a strong possibility that his de facto Pheu Thai Party

could emerge as the largest party. The formation of the

government is likely to be contentious. The UDD has threatened to return to the streets if Pheu Thai wins a plurality but

does not form the government. Obvious arm bending by the

royalist establishment to this end is a recipe for renewed

protests and violence. Should the opposite occur, and Pheu

Thai has the numbers to lead a new government, the Yellow

Shirts might regain momentum; they are unlikely to tolerate a "proxy" Thaksin government.

While elections will not resolve the political divide and the

post-election scenarios look gloomy, Thailand nevertheless

should proceed with the polls. A well-publicised electoral

code of conduct and independent monitoring by local and

international observers could help enhance their credibility

and minimise violence during the campaign. If installed

successfully, the new government with a fresh mandate

will have greater credibility to lead any longer term effort to

bring about genuine political reconciliation. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 2

II. THE RED SHIRT MOVEMENT AFTER

THE CRACKDOWN

The UDD has been in disarray since the May 2010 crackdown with its leaders detained or on the run.

Millions are

still believed to support the movement that brought tens of

thousands onto the streets of Bangkok to oppose what they

called Amathayathipatai (the rule of the traditional elites).

In February 2011, the Criminal Court released seven Red

Shirt leaders after detaining them for nine months; more than

120 of their supporters remain in detention. In the months

since the protesters were dispersed, there has been much

speculation but no solid evidence that the UDD is able or

plans to organise an armed wing. Several amateurish bombings carried out by a handful of supporters are a dangerous

sign that those who feel their voices are unheard might resort

to violence. Outside of Thailand, this political struggle has

been waged through the filing of a lawsuit against the prime

minister for "crimes against humanity" at the International

Criminal Court (ICC).

A. THE STATE OF PLAY

Since the May crackdown, fifteen leaders have been charged

with terrorism – an offence punishable by death.

Thaksin,

whom the government accused of pulling the strings, was

charged with the same offence. Seven Red Shirt leaders

were detained and five others went into hiding to evade

arrest.

Leaderless and restricted by the state of emer-

gency imposed in 24 provinces, the Red Shirts temporarily

lost momentum.

For previous Crisis Group reports on Thailand's political crisis,

see Asia Report N°192, Bridging Thailand's Deep Divide, 5 July

2010; Conflict Risk Alert, Conflict Risk Alert: Thailand, 30

April 2010; and Asia Report N°82, Thailand: Calming the Political Turmoil, 22 September 2008.

See Section C below.

Public prosecutors filed a criminal lawsuit against ten UDD

leaders and nine rank-and-file members on 11 August 2010 for

several charges, including inciting unrest and terrorism. The

authorities believe the lower-ranking supporters worked for the

late Gen. Khattiya Sawasdipol, aka Seh Daeng, who was accused of leading the armed "men in black" who attacked government forces during the UDD demonstrations. Prosecution

against the five other leaders, who escaped after the crackdown, has

been put on hold. In March 2011, four of them, except Arisman

Pongrueangrong, turned themselves in to the authorities. See fn 20.

Of the other three leaders, one was granted bail and two were

not detained because they are members of parliament and have

immunity.

The state of emergency was first imposed in all or part of five

central provinces on 7 April 2010 following the UDD's occupation of streets around Rachaprasong intersection in Bangkok's

business district. By 19 May, it had been extended to 24 provIn the strongholds in northern and north-eastern provinces,

those heading the movement were either arrested, prosecuted, or went into hiding. In the northern city of Chiang

Mai, several leaders of the Rak Chiang Mai 51 group went

underground, including Phetchawat Watthanaphongsirikul,

Kanyaphak Maneejak (aka DJ Oam) and Aphichart Insorn

(aka DJ Uan).

In the North East, political activities in

Udon Thani were hampered by the arrest, in Bangkok, of

popular radio host Khwanchai Phraiphana who had become

part of the UDD's leadership.

In Ubon Rachathani, activism

slowed down after Phichet Thabutda, who led the largest Red

Shirt group in the province, was detained. Phichet appears

to be the only local leader who faces terrorism charges.

Sombat Boonngam-anong, a well-known Red Shirt activist

who remained free, defied the state of emergency and spearheaded several "symbolic" gatherings. Without the trappings

of formal rallies, such as a stage or political speeches,

supporters tied red ribbons to remember their comrades

killed during the crackdown.

In late June, police detained

Sombat for about two weeks for violating the emergency

decree but later released him without charge.

These gatherings were held on Sundays for months and the number of

participants rapidly grew from dozens to several thousands.

It appears that anti-monarchy sentiment has become more

pronounced among the Red Shirts.

In the North and the

inces – one third of the country. The Draconian law granted the

authorities powers to ban demonstrations, detain suspects without charge for up to 30 days, and shut down media perceived as

a threat to national security. This excludes Pattani, Yala and

Narathiwat, the Malay Muslim insurgency-hit provinces where

the emergency decree has been in place since 2005.

Phetchawat, owner of the Grand Warorot Hotel in Chiang

Mai, is said to have close ties with Thaksin. Kanyaphak and

Aphichart were well-known radio hosts for Red Shirt-aligned

92.25 FM community radio station. The authorities consider the

Rak Chiang Mai 51, the first Red Shirt group in the province,

hardline as it often mobilised crowds to block roads or shut

down certain areas in the city. In November 2008, they clashed with

a group of Yellow Shirts and killed the father of the group's leader.

Crisis Group interviews, Chiang Mai, 17-22 November 2010.

Crisis Group interviews, Red Shirts, Udon Thani, 28-29 December 2010.

Crisis Group interview, Phichet Thabutda, Red Shirt leader,

Ubon Rachathani, 21 December 2010. Phichet (aka DJ Toi), led

the Chak Thong Rop group (Hoist Flag to Fight) and ran a

community radio station.

Crisis Group observed the symbolic gatherings at Rachaprasong intersection and Democracy Monument, October and November 2010.

"Mirror Foundation head nabbed under emergency decree",

Bangkok Post, 27 June 2010; "Sombat, Reds stage 'flash protest'", The Nation, 12 July 2010.

Two UDD leaders in hiding interviewed by The Straits Times

admitted that there was a growing anti-monarchy vein among

the Red Shirts and suggested that up to 90 per cent of their sup-Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 3

North East, a few Red Shirts admitted they no longer had

the pictures of the King and the Queen displayed in their

houses.

Public expression of resentment against the widely

revered monarchy has become more explicit, though still

expressed in coded language. Some graffiti found during

these gatherings criticised the role the country's highest

institution is believed to have played in the crackdown.

The

newly appointed military commander-in-chief, Gen. Prayuth

Chan-ocha, threatened in October to take legal action

against those supposedly insulting the monarchy.

The

lèse majesté law carries heavy penalties of between three to

fifteen years in prison for defaming, insulting or threatening

the King, the Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent.

Protestors then opted for more subtle and ambiguous

messages, knowing the authorities were watching for antimonarchy remarks.

Some Red Shirts are disappointed with the palace's silence

on the May crackdown. For example, in The Nation, Samang Saithongthien-ngam, a 63-year-old UDD supporter

and soft-drink vendor, said, "many of my comrades died and

you want me to forget about it? These people killed people

with impunity like nothing we did was right. How can we

live like this in the future? … Where was the King? If His

Majesty came out to speak at the time, nobody would have

been killed".

The 83-year-old monarch had previously

stepped in to resolve serious political crises, but has not

spoken about the 2010 crackdown.

He has been in poor

health in recent years and has made few public appearances

since he was hospitalised in September 2009.

In late November, the UDD filled its leadership vacuum by

announcing Thida Thavornseth as the new acting leader.

Veera Musikaphong had de facto ceased acting as UDD

porters might have become anti-monarchy. Nirmal Ghosh,

"Red shirts 'taking hardcore stance'", The Straits Times, 18

November 2010.

Pictures of the King and the Queen are often displayed to express

affection and respect for the monarchy. Crisis Group interviews,

Red Shirts, Chiang Mai and North East, November-December 2010.

Crisis Group observed Red Shirt gatherings at Rachaprasong

intersection, November 2010.

"ผบ.ทบ.ยํ้าหามชุมนุม แตคนเสื้อแดงมีสิทธิ์ ืย่นหนังสือตอเลขาฯยูเอ็นได", สํานักขาวไทย, 25

ตุลาคม 2553 ["Army chief stresses demonstration disallowed, but Red

Shirts could submit letters to UN sec-gen", Thai News Agency, 25

October 2010].

"Red shirts mark May 19 crackdown", The Nation, 20 November 2010.

King Bhumibol previously stepped in to stop bloodshed in the

1973 student-led movement against the military regime and the

1992 uprising against the military-backed government.

Although Thida was not a familiar face in the media, she is no

stranger to the UDD. She is the wife of Red Shirt leader Weng

Tojirakarn and had an important role in running the UDD political

schools set up in September 2009 to educate supporters. Some

16,000 Red Shirt supporters attended such trainings.

president because he was unable to speak publicly as a condition of being released on bail in July.

Thida's first move

was to demand the release of the movement's members. The

Criminal Court's refusal to grant bail to many Red Shirts has

reinforced the perception that the judiciary is applying double

standards; Yellow Shirts have been treated more leniently.

On 22 February 2011, the Criminal Court released seven

UDD leaders and one supporter on bail after nine months

in detention on condition they would not "incite unrest" or

leave the country without the court's permission.

Most

fugitive leaders turned themselves in after their comrades

had been released.

As of 9 March 2011, 127 Red Shirts

remain in prison, 56 of whom are in Bangkok and 71 in various prisons in the North, North East and Central region.

B. SIGNS OF VIOLENCE

As a loose network with dozens of Red Shirt groups across

the country, it has always been challenging for UDD leaders

to control and communicate with all the movement's supporters. Driven by anger, a sense of injustice, and a feeling

that peaceful options have failed, some Red Shirts have

felt compelled to take matters into their own hands and resort

to violence.

1. "Men in black"

The identity of the so-called "men in black" and their connection with the Red Shirt leadership remains unclear. The

term was first used to describe the black-clad gunmen

who appeared during the clashes on 10 April 2010, in which

five soldiers and 21 civilians were killed. The government

blamed them for the violence. The label was later used

loosely to refer to all those involved in violence during UDD

protests in 2010. Their presence raised questions about the

movement's commitment to non-violence.

"Veera granted bail, other red leaders get additional 12 days",

Bangkok Post, 31 July 2010.

"Court grants UDD terror suspects bail", Bangkok Post, 23

February 2011.

Seven UDD leaders surrendered to the authorities. Adisorn

Phaengket, Phayap Panket, Vaipot Apornrat, and Suporn Atthawong (aka Rambo Isan) are among the nineteen UDD activists

whom the public prosecutors charged with terrorism, among

other crimes, in August 2010. Two defendants in that case who

have yet to surrender are Arisman Phongrueangrong and Thaksin Shinawatra. Aree Krainara and Shinnawat Habunphat were

charged with terrorism in a separate case filed against thirteen

other Red Shirt activists in October. The two cases have been

combined. Crisis Group telephone interview, DSI investigation

officer, 4 April 2011.

Statistics gathered by National Human Rights of Thailand's Subcommittee on Civil and Political Rights and made available to

Crisis Group. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 4

The Department of Special Investigation (DSI), an investigative agency under the justice ministry, is handling all

UDD protest-related cases. It has revealed some information

about certain individuals accused of directly participating

in attacks on government and Yellow Shirt-aligned targets.

Surachai Thaewarat, whom the DSI identifies as one of the

key black-clad gunmen, was arrested on 15 July 2010. Also

known as "Rang", Surachai is alleged to have admitted that

he was an aide to Gen. Khattiya Sawasdipol, aka Seh

Daeng, a renegade officer assassinated on 13 May 2010.

The authorities believe that Seh Daeng was a key commander of an armed group allied with the Red Shirts. The

DSI accused Surachai of being involved in eight attacks

against government targets and anti-Red Shirt protesters in

Bangkok between March and May 2010 and later in illegal

arm trades.

He has denied the charges but is said to have

confessed to firing an assault rifle at the Dusit Thani Hotel

in a fit of anger after Seh Daeng was shot dead in front of

the building.

Manop Chanchangthong, a 48-year-old scavenger and

UDD guard, was caught on camera carrying an assault

rifle while wearing a balaclava during the 10 April incident. The DSI accused him of being one of the "men in

black" attacking government troops that day. The Red

Shirt leaders explained in a press conference held shortly

after the incident that Manop was carrying assault rifles

that protesters had snatched from soldiers and later stored

behind the protest stage.

Nevertheless, the DSI arrested

Manop in January 2011 and charged him with terrorism for

allegedly killing soldiers and stealing their weapons.

Although the UDD leadership had disowned Gen. Khattiya in

the early days of the protests, he often appeared at the protest

site and gave instructions to security guards before his assassination. For an account of his death, see Crisis Group Report,

Bridging Thailand's Deep Divide, op. cit., pp. 15-17.

"หร่ังโต– ไมเคยรับ อวม 8 คดีเมียอุมลูกนอยโฮ", ขาวสด, 18 กรกฎาคม 2553 ["Rang

says he never confessed to eight cases, his wife carrying kid

cries", Khao Sod, 18 July 2010]. The eight cases include seven

grenade attacks at the 11th Infantry Regiment on 28 March;

Kok Wua intersection on 10 April; oil depot in Prathumthani on

21 April; elevated train station on Silom Road on 22 April;

checkpoint near Lumpini Park on 8 May; Dusit Thani Hotel on

17 May; Lumpini police station on 19 May; and the shootings

of two police officers at Saladaeng intersection on 7 May.

"ปริศนาหร่ังแรมโบ แกงคนักรบ นปช.มือขวาเสธ.แดงของจริงหรือแพะ", ขาวสด, 25

กรกฎาคม 2553 ["Mystery about Rang: Seh Daeng's real right-hand man

or scapegoat?", Khao Sod, 25 July 2010].

"นปช.คืนพื้นที่ผานฟาฯ ยายรวมราชประสงคตอสูยกสุดทาย", มติชน, 15 เมษายน 2553

["UDD returns Phan Fa area, moves to Rachaprasong to wage a

final battle", Matichon, 15 April 2010].

"จับการดนปช. เด็กเสธ.แดงยิงปะทะทหารแยกคอกวัว", มติชน, 21 มกราคม 2554

["UDD guard close to Seh Daeng arrested for gunfight at Kok

Wua intersection", Matichon, 21 January 2011].

27-year-old Wanlop Phithiphrom is the only suspected "man

in black" who has confessed to the DSI. Arrested on 22

November 2010, Wanlop reportedly admitted that he had

fired M-79 grenades in various areas in Bangkok during the

protests, including several branches of Bangkok Bank. He

is said to have confessed to firing more than 100 grenades

at security forces during the tense stand-off around the

protest site in May 2010; and to have admitted involvement

in four grenade attacks in Chiang Mai, including an incident

at the construction company of the father-in-law of Thaksinturncoat politician Newin Chidchob.

Wanlop later told a

news conference that he acted alone out of "anger" after seeing soldiers firing live bullets at Red Shirt protesters in 2009

and disguised himself as a UDD guard during the 2010

demonstrations. Wanlop said that he learned to use a grenade launcher as a conscript in the military and the weapons

were illegally bought from a border province.

In an interview

with Crisis Group, Wanlop said he was forced to confess.

He said he was detained for two days before being taken

to the Bangkok press conference, during which he was

not allowed to receive calls from his relatives.

Much is still unknown about these gunmen and it is unclear

the DSI has captured the real culprits. It remains to be seen

whether the DSI's findings will hold up in court. If they

are true, the path from peaceful protest to violence appears

to be a worryingly short one. Volatile politics and loose gun

control can be a deadly mix in Thailand.

2. Bombings after the crackdown

Following the May crackdown, there were concerns that the

excessive use of force might prompt some Red Shirts to go

underground and resort to violence. There is no evidence

that the UDD as an organisation has adopted or aspires to

guerrilla tactics. But recent bombings carried out by individual Red Shirts, apparently on their own initiative, are a

dangerous development. The use of violence to advance an

otherwise legitimate political agenda should be condemned

by all those committed to peaceful democratic expression.

Police assert that Wanlop was involved in eight grenade attacks in Bangkok between 16 March and 19 May. He is said to

have fired grenades at three branches of the Bangkok Bank, as he

believed it supported the PAD. He was involved in a grenade

attack at Government House on 10 April. He reportedly fired

over 100 grenades at security forces during the tense stand-off

around the protest site between 14 and 19 May. In Chiang Mai,

Wanlop also reportedly admitted firing grenades at the car park of

a discount store and a furniture factory on 4 April and a military

base on 6 September."จับมือ M79 ปวนเมือง",ไทยรัฐ, 24 พฤศจิกายน 2553 ["M-79

grenade attackers arrested", Thai Rath, 24 November 2010].

Ibid.

Crisis Group interview, Wanlop Phithiphrom, Chiang Mai, 7

April 2011. He vowed to fight the case in court. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 5

At least six Red Shirts were arrested in connection with an

explosion near the headquarters of the Bhumjaithai Party on

22 June 2010.

The explosion damaged cars and injured

one bomber. Apparently poorly trained, he touched the

device after the remote control failed to trigger the bomb.

Detphon Phutthachong, one of the six alleged offenders,

said his motive was ideological: "I did not want to kill anybody but only wanted to create an incident to call for the

government's attention to the Red Shirts' plight". Detphon

said that he and his co-conspirators originally wanted to plant

their bomb at the Democrat Party headquarters but it was

too tightly guarded. He said the attack was their own idea.

Two other alleged offenders – Warisriya Boonsom and

Kobchai Boonplod – were arrested in Cambodia and extradited in early July 2010. The DSI believes that Kobchai, a

gemstone seller, and Warisriya, a jewellery designer, were

involved in the planning.

Kobchai said the three bombers

stayed overnight at his house but denied being involved

himself. He said that he supported the UDD cause and

viewed the ammarts (traditional elites) as an obstacle to progress.

All six are on trial for terrorism and other charges.

On 5 October 2010, a powerful explosion ripped through a

five-storey apartment in Nonthaburi's Bangbuathong district,

a province north-west of Bangkok, instantly killing four

people and extensively damaging the building and nearby

houses.

One of the victims, Samai Wongsuwan, whose

severed arm was found at the site, was a Red Shirt from

Chiang Mai. Police believe the bomb, made from ten kilograms of TNT, exploded while Samai was assembling it.

They have said the bomb bore the signature of at least

four other explosions in Bangkok.

Samai's wife said her husband was staunchly loyal to Thaksin and "he wanted to bring back democracy". He joined the

UDD demonstrations in Bangkok and was shot in the cheek

during the 10 April 2010 incident. After leaving home

shortly after the May crackdown, he never returned. She was

The party, led by Newin Chidchob, was originally a faction

of the Thaksin proxy, the PPP; after the Constitutional Court

disbanded the PPP in 2008, Newin and dozens of MPs switched

sides to join the Democrat Party-led coalition and founded the

Bhumjaithai Party.

"ปชป. โยงผูส่ังการเดียวกัน ิวนาศกรรม 4 จุด", มติชน, 27 มิถุนายน 2553 ["Democrat

Party says masterminds planned bombings in four places", Matichon, 27 July 2010].

Crisis Group interview, DSI official in charge of Red Shirt-related

cases, Bangkok, 4 February 2011.

Crisis Group interview, Kobchai Boonplod, Bangkok, 21

January 2011; "แฉสูตรบึ้มออ-อายพบผลิตจํานวนมาก", ไทยรัฐ, 8 กรกฎาคม 2553

["Revealing Or-Ai's bomb formula used to produce big bombs",

Thai Rath, 8 July 2010].

"Blast rocks Nonthaburi", The Nation, 6 October 2010.

"Blast toll climbs to four", Bangkok Post, 7 October 2010.

"proud" that her husband died for his cause.

Samai apparently had a history of violence: an arrest warrant had been

issued for his alleged involvement in an attack during the

opening ceremony of the office of Yellow Shirt-aligned "We

Love the King" group in Chiang Mai in August 2009.

In another unsuccessful bomb attack, Red Shirt guard Thawatchai Eiamnak was arrested on 24 January 2011 while

riding a motorcycle around the PAD's protest site to look for

a location to plant a bomb. The incident took place while

the Yellow Shirts were gathering for a sit-in to protest the

government's handling of the disputed Preah Vihear temple.

Police later arrested three other men in possession of a

rocket-propelled grenade launcher, grenades and ammunition

at an apartment.

Similar to the other bombers, Thawatchai

did not have sophisticated knowledge about bomb-making.

He explained he wanted to see "change" in the country, and

said he did not mean to harm anyone.

His aim was to

frighten the Yellow Shirts so they would cancel their demonstration. He said he had resorted to violence after he concluded that peaceful protests had failed and saw fellow Red

Shirts killed by government forces. He asked: "Wouldn't

you do it if you have a chance?"

3. An armed wing?

Despite some allegations, there is no solid evidence that the

UDD leadership is organising an armed wing, although the

idea may have support from more radical Red Shirt elements. Arisman Pongrueangrong, a UDD leader widely seen

as a hardliner who has fled the country, said in an interview

that "nowhere on earth has achieved democracy without

some kind of armed rebellion against those who suppress

democracy. Therefore, the struggle for democracy must join

together [an] armed rebellion and a mass movement". He

also said "it's pretty clear that the government want[s] to get

rid of us because they believe that the Red Shirts are moving

towards being armed. In reality, we don't have any arms".

Arisman, a popular pop singer-turned-political activist,

said while he did not believe rank-and-file Red Shirts were

"พลิกปูมสมัยมือบึ้มบางบัวทอง อดีตทหารคลังแสง-เลือดแดงเขม", คมชัดลึก, 8 ตุลาคม 2553

["Samai, the Bangbuathong's bomber: Former conscripted soldiers

guarding arsenal - thick red blood", Kom Chad Luek, 8 October 2010].

"Blast toll climbs to four", Bangkok Post, 7 October 2010.

"มือระเบิดยอมรับมีเปาหมายเปลี่ยนบานเมือง", ไทยรัฐ, 26 มกราคม 2554 ["Bomber

admits he aspires to change the country", Thai Rath, 26 January

2011]. Police said Thawatchai admitted being involved in three

other incidents, including the 25 July 2010 explosion outside

the Big C discount store near Rachaprasong intersection that

killed one and injured eight people.

Ibid.

Crisis Group interview, Thawatchai Eiamnak, Bangkok, 24

January 2011. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 6

capable of organising themselves into an armed units, he

hoped soldiers and police officers would join their struggle.

The arrest of eleven men at a resort in Chiang Mai on 2

October 2010 revealed that some Red Shirts may have attempted to organise small scale weapons training outside

Thailand. The men admitted that they and 28 other Thais had

gone to Cambodia in June for training, where they attended

lectures on politics and were taught to use weapons by

Cambodians.

Three of those arrested are known to have

joined the Red Shirt demonstrations and two had been injured in the clashes.

The DSI said six Red Shirt leaders had

organised the training.

However, after the DSI initially

said the group planned to attack prominent politicians after

their return in August 2010, it surprisingly did not prosecute

the eleven men, saying that the accused were cooperative.

Instead, the men were placed in a witness protection program. This turn of events casts some doubt on the accuracy

of the information the DSI initially disclosed. Phnom Penh

responded angrily to the DSI's revelation about the weapons

training and accused Bangkok of playing "the dirty games

of concocting evidence" to divert public attention away from

the government's political problems.

One of the arrested men gave a different account, admitting

he had gone to Siem Reap in northern Cambodia for weapons training believing it was preparation for a job as a security guard for politicians. During the training, three UDD

leaders gave lectures on politics and discussed "oppression

by the Thai state" and the problem of "double standards".

He said he attended a week-long course given by Cambodian

soldiers on how to use assault rifles and grenade launchers.

The training acquainted him with these weapons but, in his

view, was too short to expect anyone to be skilful users.

Andrew Spooner, "Interview with Thailand's most wanted –

Arisman Pongrueangrong", asiacorrespondent.com, 9 December 2010.

Crisis Group interview, DSI official in charge of Red Shirtrelated cases, Bangkok, 4 February 2011; Crisis Group telephone interview, one of the eleven arrested men, February 2010.

"เปดแฟมลับ 11 นักรบแดงภารกิจปวนเมือง ลอบสังหารผูนํา", โพสตทูเดย, 8 ตุลาคม 2553

["Disclosing confidential file: Eleven Red Shirt warriors plan to

assassinate leaders", Post Today, 8 October 2010].

Crisis Group interview, DSI official in charge of Red Shirtrelated cases, Bangkok, 4 February 2011. According to the DSI,

three are UDD leaders and the other three are leaders of the Rak

Chiang Mai 51 group.

" ีดเอสไอแฉลางสมอง ลมสถาบัน นักรบแดง ฝกคายเขมร กัมพูชาอัดไทยปายสี", คมชัดลึก,

12 ตุลาคม 2553 ["DSI reveals Red Shirt warriors trained in Cambodian

camp, taught to overthrow monarchy; Cambodia claims unfair

accusation", Kom Chad Luek, 12 October 2010] and "11 arrested fighters cooperating", The Nation, 5 October 2010. The supposed targets were Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and

Newin Chidchob.

"Thawatchai slams DSI over terror report", Bangkok Post, 14

October 2010.

While driven to join the UDD in 2010 because of what he

saw as "injustice" and "double standards", he believed it

would be counterproductive for the movement to pursue an

armed struggle.

C. INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN

Thaksin and the UDD have launched an international campaign to hold the Abhisit government accountable for the

death of 92 people and injury of nearly 2,000 during the

2010 demonstrations and resultant government crackdown.

While most of the dead were protesters, eleven soldiers were

also killed.

On 31 January 2011, Amsterdam & Peroff

LLP, the firm of Thaksin's lawyer Robert Amsterdam, filed

a petition with the ICC Office of the Prosecutor on behalf of

the UDD, calling for an investigation into what it argued

amounted to "crimes against humanity".

It remains unclear if the ICC has jurisdiction. Thailand has

signed the Rome Statute but has not yet ratified it.

Amsterdam argues that the ICC has jurisdiction because

the British-born Prime Minister Abhisit is a citizen of the

United Kingdom, which is a state party to the statute.

Crisis Group telephone interview, one of the eleven arrested

men, February 2010.

Information from Erawan Emergency Center, the Bangkok

Metropolitan Authority's official centre recording casualties

relating to the Red Shirt rallies, dated 1 June 2010.

"Application to Investigate the Situation of the Kingdom of

Thailand with Regard to the Commission of Crimes against

Humanity", The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship, 31 January 2011, p. 83. The ICC is governed by the Rome

statute which entered into force on 1 July 2002. It is the first

international permanent court with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals accused of the most serious crimes of international

concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war

crimes and the crime of aggression. The ICC is a court of last

resort and acts only if the national judicial system is unable or

unwilling to investigate or prosecute. See "About the Court",

ICC website, www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/.

The ICC can accept cases through three channels: from a

state party of the statute, the UN Security Council or the ICC

prosecutor. The channel available for individuals or groups aspiring to make direct complaints is through the prosecutor,

which was used by Amsterdam to submit the case against the

Thai prime minister. The ICC does not have universal jurisdiction. It could only exercise jurisdiction if: 1) the accused is a

national of a state party or a state otherwise accepting the

Court's jurisdiction; 2) the crime took place on the territory of a

state party or a state otherwise accepting its jurisdiction; or 3)

the UNSC had referred the situation to the prosecutor, irrespective of the nationality of the accused or the location of the

crime. For more information, see "Jurisdiction and Admissibility", ICC website, www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+

Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Jurisdiction+and+Admissibility.htm.

"Red shirt lawyer targets PM in petition lodged with ICC",

Bangkok Post, 1 February 2011. Abhisit was born in Newcastle Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 7

Abhisit admits he has never renounced his UK citizenship,

but says the fact that he has never derived any benefit from

being a British national should be enough evidence to

prove that he chooses to be a Thai citizen

As of publication, the ICC prosecutor has not decided

whether to take up the case and the prospect of a Britishborn Thai prime minister standing trial before the ICC is distant.

Even if the ICC does not take up the case, the UDD

has used the campaign to tell its side of the story and tarnish

the Abhisit government's image internationally.

III. THE YELLOW SHIRTS AND THE

PREAH VIHEAR DISPUTE

In its latest campaign, the PAD appears to have broken with

the Democrat Party, raising the spectre of a serious split

within establishment forces. In 2008, the PAD's protracted

demonstrations and the Constitutional Court ruling to disband the governing PPP helped tip the political balance and

allowed the formation of the Democrat-led coalition government. Two years later, the Yellow Shirts are attacking

Abhisit for failing to defend "Thai territory" in the disputed

area near the Preah Vihear temple and are calling for his

resignation.

The International Court of Justice unequivocally ruled in

1962 that the Preah Vihear temple was "situated in territory

under the sovereignty of Cambodia" but ownership of the

surrounding area has been the subject of a long-running

dispute.

The PAD used this issue to whip up nationalist

sentiment against the Thaksin-backed government in 2008.

It accused then foreign minister Noppadon Patama of "selling out the country" after he expressed support for Phnom

Penh's efforts to list the temple as a World Heritage site.

upon Tyne in 1964 and under the 1948 Nationality Act is a

British citizen. "Trampling on the Truth the PM Mark Abhisit

Way", 7 February 2011, robertamsterdam.com/thailand/?p=564.

"PM admits holding dual nationality", Bangkok Post, 25 February 2011.

Prominent Thai legal scholar Visit Muntarbhorn argues that,

in international law, an "effective link" with a country needs to

be proved, such as the person's residency, rather than the mere

claim that a person has the nationality of a second country. See

Vitit Muntarbhorn, "The International Criminal Court and

Thailand", Bangkok Post, 27 February 2011.

"Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear" (Cambodian

v. Thailand) Merits, International Court of Justice's Judgment of

15 June 1962. A summary is available at www.icj-cij.org/

docket/index.php?sum=284&code=ct&p1=3&p2=3&case=

45&k=46&p3=5.

Foreign Minister Noppadon signed a joint statement on behalf of the government on 22 May 2008, expressing Thailand's

support for Cambodia's bid to list the Preah Vihear temple as a

World Heritage site. He argued that the statement made it clear

Noppadon resigned in July that year after being criticised for

his statement. In the same month, Cambodia succeeded in

having the temple added to the list and then was required

to submit a management plan for the site. The PAD's

nationalist campaigns have complicated and delayed negotiations over the development of the area.

In August 2010, the PAD held rallies in protest of Phnom

Penh's submission of a management plan to the World Heritage Committee. The Thai government also objected to

Cambodia's plan at the committee meeting, claiming it

involved the disputed area that had not been clearly demarcated. The committee decided to postpone discussion

until 2011.

On 29 December 2010, Cambodia arrested seven Thais,

including leader of the Yellow Shirt-aligned Thai Patriots

Network Veera Somkhwamkid and lawmaker Panich Vikitseth of the ruling Democrat Party, for allegedly encroaching

into its territory near the Preah Vihear temple.

Five of

them, including Panich, were freed in mid-January 2011 after

a Cambodian court handed down suspended sentences for

trespassing.

At the time, Veera and his secretary Ratree

Phiphatthanaphaibul were still on trial.

On 25 January 2011, the Yellow Shirts launched a major

demonstration in Bangkok. As it began, they made three

demands from the government: the cancellation of the 2000

Memorandum of Understanding with Cambodia on border

demarcation near Preah Vihear, Thailand's withdrawal

from the World Heritage Committee, and the removal of any

Cambodian presence on "Thai territory".

Soon after the rally began, the situation at the border heated

up. Hostilities between Thai and Cambodian soldiers broke

out near the Preah Vihear temple between 4 and 7 February,

killing three Thais and eight Cambodians and forcing

thousands of Thai villagers to evacuate.

The deadly clashes

worried the international community and prompted Indonesia, as ASEAN's current chair, to intervene. The UN

Security Council convened a meeting in New York on 14

February, attended by the foreign ministers of both countries

that the site proposed for the listing did not include the disputed

area and that both countries would continue to demarcate the area

through the Joint Border Commission. Interview with Noppadon Patama on the "Intelligence" program, Voice TV, 22 February 2011, available at http://shows.voicetv.co.th/intelligence/

4629.html.

"Ministry praises delay of temple decision", Bangkok Post, 30

July 2010.

"Democrat MP Panich among seven Thais arrested in Cambodia",

The Nation, 30 December 2011.

"Five Thais get suspended terms", The Nation, 22 January 2011.

"Hello, we're back", The Nation, 26 January 2011.

"Cambodia to ask Thailand sign ceasefire deal", Reuters, 17

February 2011. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 8

as well as Indonesia. The Council called for a "permanent

ceasefire" and expressed support for ASEAN's role in

facilitating talks.

Indonesia expressed its willingness to

send observers to the border to defuse the conflict.

Meanwhile, the trial of the two PAD allies still detained in

Cambodia's notorious Prey Sar prison continued. On 1

February, the court found Veera and Ratree guilty of illegal

entry into Cambodia, trespassing on a military area, and espionage, and sentenced them to eight and six years in prison,

respectively.

They have decided not to appeal the verdict

and are seeking a royal pardon.

The PAD fiercely criticised the government for ceding Thai

sovereignty to Cambodia by not protesting against the trials

of the seven Thais. In a 5 February statement, it accused

the prime minister of "lacking leadership," being "narrowminded" and not doing enough to defend Thai territory. It

also charged that this government was highly corrupt. The

statement called for Abhisit to resign to pave the way for a

new leader who is more "capable", "decisive", and "honest".

Prominent PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul later told

his Yellow Shirt supporters said that this administration was

"worse than any other previous government".

The PAD's call for a new "virtuous" leader has prompted

speculation that it is again urging the military to intervene.

Without explicitly spelling this argument out, some speakers

on PAD stages have opposed the government's plan to hold

elections. Nationalist Gen. Therdsak Satjarak, the Air Force's

former deputy commander, told the crowd "nowadays,

there are only bandits and lizards in the parliament. If

there are no good people, we'd better not have an election.

I believe that the holy spirits will protect our country and

"Security Council urges permanent ceasefire after recent ThaiCambodia clashes", press release, UN Security Council, 14

February 2011.

"Thailand, Cambodia agree to observers", Bangkok Post, 23

February 2011.

"Veera gets eight years in prison for espionage", Bangkok

Post, 2 February 2011.

The Thai Patriots Network wanted Veera to appeal the verdict to defy Cambodia's territorial claim to the disputed area.

Veera's family preferred to seek royal pardon because he was

more likely to secure an early release. "Two Thais jailed in

Cambodia decide not to appeal verdict", The Nation, 3 March

2011.

"พธม.แถลงการณ ีจ้ 'มารค' ลาออก ีช้ลมเหลวบริหารงาน ทําไทยเสียอธิปไตย", ASTV

ผูจัดการออนไลน, 5 กุมภาพันธ 2554 ["PAD issues statement calling for Abhisit

to resign; blames him for bad management and causing Thailand to

loss sovereignty", ASTV Manager Online, 5 February 2011].

"สนธิแฉอดีตมารคชอบแหลมานาน ปชป.ทั้งขายทั้งโกงชาติ – ล่ันสูไมถอย", ASTV

ผูจัดการออนไลน, 14 มีนาคม 2554 ["Sondhi charges Mark (Abhisit) a liar;

Democrat Party cheats the country – vows to fight to the end",

ASTV Manager Online, 14 March 2011].

elections won't happen in the near future".

If the election

takes place, Sondhi called for his Yellow Shirt supporters

to mark the "no vote" box on their ballots to protest "dirty"

politics.

Some observers think the border crisis sparked

by the Yellow Shirts could provide a pretext for a military

coup.

A coup can never be completely ruled out in a

country that has seen eighteen attempted and successful

coups since Thailand changed from an absolute monarchy

to a constitutional monarchy in 1932.

But the PAD is struggling to be politically relevant. The

number of protesters camping out near Government

House is much smaller compared to the prolonged rally in

2008. A police estimate put the average crowd size at a

few hundred, with a peak of around 2,000.

Sondhi says

that it is not the "quantity" but the "quality" of protesters that

matters.

The nationalist campaign centred on Preah Vihear

does not seem to appeal to urban middle class supporters

who had previously joined the PAD's fight to overthrow

Thaksin. The harsh attacks on Abhisit could alienate PAD

supporters who are also loyal to the Democrat Party.

The New Politics Party, the PAD's electoral arm, might also

go its own way. Sondhi has called for the party to boycott

the forthcoming polls and threatened to sever the movement's relationship with it if it does not.

The New Politics

Party's leader, Somsak Kosaisuk, insisted on filing candidates and said "it's normal to separate if we have different

"พล.อ.ปรีชา ีจ้มทภ.1 ผันตัวหนีประยุทธจับมือกองทัพปชช.กูชาติ", ASTV ผูจัดการออนไ

ลน, 13 มีนาคม 2554 ["Gen. Preecha urges First Army commander to turn

his back from Prayuth; join hands with people's army to rescue

country", ASTV Manager Online, 13 March 2011].

Sondhi drew an analogy between eating and casting votes, telling the crowd that you know food is "dirty" and the cook has

"spat" on them, you should not eat them. See"สนธิซัดพวกอัปมงคลปลอ

ยขาวทําลายพธม. ยํ้า 'โนโหวต' ลางการเมืองสกปรก", ASTV ผูจัดการออนไลน, 30 มีนาคม 2554

["Sondhi condemns bastard for leaking news to destroy PAD, insists 'no vote' to clean dirty politics", ASTV Manager Online,

30 March 2011].

Crisis Group interview, Thai political scientist, Bangkok, 3

March 2011; Chris Baker, speech at a seminar on "Stones, Flags

and Guns: A Discussion on How Competing Visions of Thailand

are Shaping Events from Preah Vihear to Rajdomnoen", Foreign

Correspondents' Club of Thailand, Bangkok, 24 February

2011. An audio recording of the presentation can be found at:

http://blogs.straitstimes.com/2011/2/23/stones-flags-and-guns.

Crisis Group telephone interview, Maj. Gen. Prawut Thavornsiri,

national police spokesman, 10 March 2011.

"พธม. ฟองพรบ.ม่ันคงโมฆะ ีจ้ ิวเชียรส่ังเลิกคดีกอการราย",ASTVผูจัดการออนไลน, 25

กุมภาพันธ 2554 ["PAD calls for the ISA be revoked and terrorism

charge dropped, ASTV Manager Online, 25 February 2011].

"สนธิซัดพวกอัปมงคลปลอยขาวทําลาย พธม. ยํ้า 'โนโหวต' ลางการเมืองสกปรก",

ASTV ผูจัดการออนไลน, 30 มีนาคม 2554 ["Sondhi condemns bastard for

leaking news to destroy PAD, insists 'no vote' to clean dirty politics", ASTV Manager Online, 30 March 2011]. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 9

opinions".

However, the party is unlikely to be a pivotal

force in parliamentary politics, judging from its poor performance in the Bangkok elections for municipal and district

councillors in August 2010. It failed to win a single seat.

IV. THE "ROADMAP" TO

RECONCILIATION

Under pressure to break the deadlock and clear the Red

Shirt protesters from Bangkok's business district, Abhisit

announced on 3 May 2010 a "roadmap" to national reconciliation and proposed to dissolve parliament within five

months. The offer prompted serious disagreement among

the UDD leaders. While moderates welcomed the compromise, hardliners refused to end the protest. After inconclusive negotiations, the military cleared the streets by force.

After the crackdown, the offer of an early election was

retracted but the roadmap stayed in place. Four committees

were established to work on fact-finding with regard to

the violence, constitutional amendments, socio-economic

disparity and media reform. While there has been some modest progress, none of the committees has made concrete

and significant steps that will defuse the protracted conflict

in the short term.

1. Fact-finding

The Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand

(TRCT) was formally established on 15 July 2010. This

committee was mandated to investigate and establish facts

about violent incidents in April and May 2010, compensate

victims of violence, and suggest measures to reduce conflict and prevent further violence. At the end of its two-year

term, it will submit a final report to the government that

will be made public at the same time.

This provides some

reassurance that the TRCT will not repeat the mistake of

the investigation of the 1992 May uprising, the findings

of which were never publicly released.

The TRCT has struggled to get information from the various

parties involved. Somchai Homla-or, head of its subcommittee on fact-finding, admitted that some Red Shirt

supporters view the commission as a government tool, while

"สัมภาษณพิเศษ: เรายังมีสติ … ไมคิดฆาตัวตาย",โพสตทูเดย, 2 เมษายน 2554 ["Exclusive

interview: We are still in our right mind … we won't commit

suicide", Post Today, 2 April 2011].

"Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on the Truth

for National Reconciliation", Royal Gazette, 16 July 2010.

Somchai Homla-or, head of the TRCT's subcommittee on

fact-finding, spoke at a briefing for diplomats and international

organisations, Bangkok, 9 December 2010. The governmentappointed committee that investigated the 1992 demonstrations

was headed by Kanit Na Nakorn, also the TRCT's chairman.

authorities have been slow to cooperate. While the DSI

has shared some information with the TRCT, the commission has a hard time getting military and police officers to

speak.

The commission has no authority to subpoena witnesses and can only invite them to testify.

In mid January 2011, the commission was scheduled to release the

first of a series of progress reports due every six months

but has yet to do so. At that time, Somchai instead publicly complained that the TRCT had not received responses

to its requests to interview army officers on the ground

and for autopsies from the government forensic agency;

private telephone companies had also refused to provide

information.

In early April, he said the military had become more willing to cooperate, sending key commanders

to testify at public hearings on violent incidents. Police officers are still reluctant to cooperate and those who do testify

are sometimes not the most knowledgeable.

Although it gathers information from all relevant parties,

the TRCT relies heavily on government agencies for data.

The DSI's reversal of its initial findings in the investigation

of the death of Japanese cameraman Hiro Muramoto illustrates how controversial seeking the truth about the AprilMay 2010 violence has become. Muramoto was shot on 10

April 2010 while covering the clashes for Reuters television.

The Japanese government attaches great importance to this

case.

Reuters has also been vigorous in pursuing and reporting the investigation. Tharit Pengdit, the DSI secretarygeneral, at a 20 January 2011 press conference said that

an initial investigation had concluded that twelve out of 89

victims killed during the April-May demonstrations were

attributed to the UDD and thirteen to government forces.

Crisis Group interview, Somchai Homla-or, head of the

TRCT's subcommittee on fact-finding, Bangkok, 1 February

2011.

Clause 9.5 in "Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister

on the Truth for National Reconciliation", op. cit.

Thomas Fuller, "Thai inquiry into violence falters", The New

York Times, 24 January 2011.

Crisis Group telephone interview, Somchai Homla-or, head

of the TRCT's subcommittee on fact-finding, 4 April 2011. The

TRCT has organised a series of public hearings on several violent incidents during the 2010 demonstrations since January

2011 so as to allow all relevant parties to present their side of

the story, interact and share their opinions.

During an official visit to Thailand in August 2010, Japanese

Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada laid flowers at the site where

Muramoto was killed before meeting the Thai prime minister.

"Rights groups demand it reveal some findings", Bangkok Post, 24

August 2010.

The DSI did not include three victims killed in the provinces

on 19 May 2010. Two men were shot dead during the clashes at

the governor's office in Udon Thani and another man was shot

dead as Red Shirts surrounded the house of an MP in Khon

Kaen who had defected from Pheu Thai to the Bhumjaithai Party.

A DSI investigator said that the case in Khon Kaen is considered unrelated to the demonstration, while police did not for-Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 10

Muramoto was among the latter.

The DSI said it would

forward its initial findings to police for further investigation.

In the DSI's leaked report, investigators stated there was

solid evidence leading them to believe that Muramoto had

been killed by the security forces. They cited two witnesses,

a police officer and a UDD protestor, who testified that the

shot was fired from the direction of soldiers. They also

argued that the footage shot by Muramoto just before he was

killed showed protestors standing on the side, indicating

that Muramoto was facing the soldiers. The report noted that

the autopsy supported this analysis because it showed that

the bullet pierced through the left side of his chest and his

upper right arm.

A month after this announcement, the DSI chief reversed the

preliminary findings based on an examination by a police

forensic expert Lt. Gen. Amporn Jaruchinda. He said that

the wound was inconsistent with the type of bullet used by

soldiers and that Muramoto was unlikely to have been

shot by government forces.

The Bangkok Post cited an army

source that the military was unhappy with the DSI's preliminary finding and reported that army chief of staff Gen.

Daphong Ratanasuwan had visited the DSI chief to make

a complaint, although Tharit denied such a meeting had

taken place.

In addition to determining what happened in April-May

2010, the perpetrators of violence must be brought to justice

for genuine reconciliation to be possible. Unfortunately,

the TRCT has no mandate to prosecute and when combined

with the lack of cooperation, a compromised fact-finding

process is unlikely to support larger reconciliation efforts.

ward the cases in Udon Thani to the DSI and the circumstances

of their deaths were unclear. Crisis Group telephone interview,

DSI investigator, 24 March 2011.

"25 protest deaths explained", Bangkok Post, 21 January

2011. According to the DSI's initial findings, the security

forces were also involved in the deaths of an employee of Dusit

Zoo on 10 April, a soldier who was killed during a clash near

Don Muang airport on 28 April, and three civilians at Pathumwanaram Buddhist temple on 19 May 2010.

DSI's investigation report dated 15 November 2010 obtained

by Crisis Group. Also see Jason Szep and Ambika Ahuja, "Exclusive: Probe reveals Thai troops' role in civilian deaths", Reuters,

10 December 2010.

Amporn, formerly the chief of the police office of forensic

science, argued that Muramoto was shot by a 7.62-mm bullet,

which could have been fired from an AK-47 or another rifle

using a similar size of ammunition. The military said that its

soldiers were armed with U.S.-designed M-16s or its Israelimade equivalent Tavor TAR 21 on that day. Both types of rifles

use 5.56-mm bullets. "Thailand to further probe killing of

Reuters journalist", Reuters, 28 February 2011.

"DSI changes ruling on cameraman's death", Bangkok Post, 27

February 2011.

2. Constitutional amendments

The main achievement of the constitutional amendment

committee, led by political scientist Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, has been to change electoral rules. In November

2010, the cabinet decided to follow up on two out of five

proposed amendments: Article 190 on parliamentary approval for international treaties and Articles 93-98 on the

electoral system. The government declined to review controversial provisions, such as Article 237 on party dissolution and Articles 111-121 on the selection process for

senators, which were also put forward for amendment by the

committee.

The parliament passed the amendment of Article 190, stipulating that an organic law be enacted within one year to

specify types of international treaties that require parliamentary approval as well as to lay out the negotiation framework and procedures for signing. The PAD has been able to

use the existing provision to draw out Thailand and Cambodia's negotiations on the Preah Vihear dispute. The foreign

ministry has submitted the minutes of the Joint Border

Committee's meetings to the parliament for approval.

Given strong nationalist sentiments during the past three

years, determining which international treaties have possible

impact on Thai territory has become highly politicised.

The PAD blocked approval of the three previous meetings'

minutes, which has led to long delays in the bilateral talks.

The parliament deliberated on the minutes in late March

2011 but MPs cannot agree if parliamentary endorsement

is required.

It remains unclear if the organic law would

resolve the problem.

"6 ประเด็นแกรธน. ฉบับสมบัติธํารงธัญวงศ", มติชน, 26 ตุลาคม 2553 ["Six points

for constitutional amendment proposed by Sombat Thamrongthanyawong", Matichon, 26 October 2010].

This follows an Administrative Court ruling on 28 June 2008

that found the PPP government of Samak Sundaravej to have

violated this provision because it did not seek parliamentary

approval on an issue that could affect Thai territory before signing a joint statement with Phnom Penh. The court issued an injunction banning the cabinet resolution that expressed support

for Cambodia's effort to list the Preah Vihear temple as a World

Heritage site.

Democrat Party MP Surichok Sopha submitted a request to the

Constitutional Court to decide whether the minutes are to be

considered as treaties under Article 190. On 30 March, the

court rejected the case, stating it could rule on the matter only if

the constitutionality of the parliament-approved documents was

at stake. At this stage, it is up to the executive and legislative

branches to decide. "Court sends JBC minutes issue back to

parliament", The Nation, 31 March 2011.

"รัฐธรรมนูญแหงราชอาณาจักรไทย แกไขเพิ่มเติม (ฉบับที่ 2) พุทธศักราช 2554",

ราชกิจจานุเบกษา, 4 มีนาคม 2554 ["Amendment of the Constitution of the

Kingdom of Thailand (Number 2) 2011", Royal Gazette, 4

March 2011]. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 11

As for the electoral system, the committee proposed a new

formula of 375 constituency-based members of parliaments

(MPs) and 125 party list seats, a change from the previous 400:80 ratio. Sombat argued that the increasing numbers of party list MPs would strengthen political parties.

The committee also recommended a change to the voting

system from multi-MP to single-MP constituencies. After

several rounds of heated parliamentary debate, the amendments were approved in February 2011 and will be in effect during the forthcoming elections.

The changes may

give an edge to the ruling Democrat Party (see below). By

his own admission, Sombat said that he agreed with criticisms that, overall, the amendment was "trivial" and had

done little to reform the political system or address the

protracted conflict.

3. Socio-economic reforms

The government set up two separate committees on nationwide socio-economic reforms dubbed "country reform" in

June 2010; former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun

heads a nineteen-member National Reform Committee to

lay out strategies and Prawes Wasi, a medical doctor-cumsocial activist, chairs a 27-member National Reform Assembly to engage civil society in this effort. The committees have identified fourteen areas for reform, including land

use, social welfare, education, decentralisation, the justice

system, health care and water management.

In February 2011, the National Reform Committee made

its first concrete proposal on land reform, which included

suggesting restricting land ownership through a progressive

tax system. The committee found that many poor farmers

"ดร.สมบัติประธานแกไขรัฐธรรมนูญ … เราไมไดสนวาใครจะไดประโยชน", ประชาชาติธุ

รกิจออนไลน, 29 สิงหาคม 2553 ["Head of constitutional amendment committee Dr. Sombat: We don't care who will benefit", Prachachart

Thurakit Online, 29 August 2010].

"รัฐธรรมนูญแหงราชอาณาจักรไทย แกไขเพิ่มเติม (ฉบับที่ 1) พุทธศักราช 2554,

ราชกิจจานุเบกษา, 3 มีนาคม 2554 ["Amendment of the Constitution of the

Kingdom of Thailand (Number 1) 2011", Royal Gazette, 4

March 2011].

In February 2011, the committee proposed that the political

party that wins the most seats in the party list system form the

government. The idea was seen to favour the ruling Democrat

Party, perhaps because the committee floated the suggestion at

the same time that Kobsak Sabhavasu, head of the Democrat

Party's election campaign team, publicly voiced a similar idea.

However, no other constitutional amendment will be considered

by this government and it remains only a proposal for the time being. "สัมภาษณพิเศษ: สมบัติธํารงธัญวงศสูตรรบ. ปาร ีต้ลิสตแกวงจรอุบาทว", ขาวสด, 2

มีนาคม 2553 ["Exclusive interview with Sombat Thamrongthanyawong: Government from party list helps breaks vicious circle",

Khao Sod, 2 March 2011].

For details on the work of the National Reform Committee

and National Reform Assembly, see www.reform.or.th.

had no land and a few wealthy landlords owned a large

amount of unused land. It proposed that those holding

more than 50 rais of land (19.7 acres) shoulder the burden

of a 5 per cent tax per rai calculated on the value of the

land.

The government has been reluctant to push forward

the proposal, which could affect large businesses and

other powerful groups, including financiers of the parties.

It is likely to drag its feet on the issue until the parliament

is dissolved.

In March 2011, Anand announced that he would resign as

the chair of the National Reform Committee shortly before

the election, surprising even the prime minister. Anand said

that he wanted to give the new government the freedom to

decide if it needed the committee.

While the two committees both have a three-year term, Anand's resignation suggests they may not continue to push for the implementation

of their proposals or work on other issues after the election.

4. Media reform

Media reform has been an issue in Thailand for many

years. This committee, headed by Yubol Benjarongkit, dean

of Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Communication

Arts, held consultations with various groups and made its

recommendations to the government in December 2010.

First, it called for the government to make official information more accessible to the public in accordance with

the 1997 Information Act. Second, it urged the government to expedite the enactment of the long-delayed legislation – known as the Frequency Allocation Law – to

govern the establishment of the National Broadcasting and

Telecommunications Commission (NBTC). This body is

to allocate broadcasting, radio and telecom frequencies and

regulate their operation. The law was promulgated around

the same time that the recommendations were submitted

but new mechanisms need to be established to make the

NBTC fully functional.

Third, it proposed the government

allocate funds to establish independent bodies to monitor

and handle complaints about the media.

Abhisit agreed

to follow up on the recommendations but has not come up

with any concrete plan for their implementation.

"Anand's land reform proposals approved in principle", The

Nation, 15 February 2011; "ขอเสนอปฏิรูปการจัดการที่ดินเพื่อการเกษตร",

คณะกรรมการปฏิรูปประเทศ, 7 กุมภาพันธ 2554 ["Proposal on land reform of agriculture", National Reform Committee, 7 February 2011], available

at www.reform.or.th.

"PM asks for clarity on NRC resignations", Bangkok Post, 28

March 2011.

"Transition to NBTC begins", Bangkok Post, 21 December 2010.

"จุฬาฯ ืย่นขอเสนอปฎิรูปสื่อ- ีจ้เรงมีกสทช", เดลินิวส, 16 ธันวาคม 2553 ["Chula

submits media reform proposal, calls for enactment of NBTC law",

Daily News, 16 December 2010]. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 12

V. UNEVEN APPLICATION OF THE LAW

If genuine reconciliation is to take place, one central issue

that needs to be addressed is the uneven application of the

law. The UDD has questioned the role of the judiciary in

politics and believes that discrepancies in rulings related

to the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts are evidence of a double

standard. This fuels a sense of injustice. The government's

handling of media affiliated to colour-coded groups has also

raised concerns.

A. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

The judiciary has played a pivotal role in politics since

2006, following King Bhumibol Adulyadej's recommendation that judges use their authority to resolve the political crisis. While some believe their intervention has been

necessary to break deadlocks, the judiciary's credibility is at

stake. In late 2010, a series of video clips was posted on

YouTube that further cast doubt on the impartiality of the

Constitutional Court. The clips emerged at the same time

that the Democrat Party was being tried for electoral fraud,

which could lead to the court disbanding the party. The

party had allegedly misused the 29 million baht ($943,600)

provided by the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT)

for campaigning. Another case of electoral fraud against

the Democrat Party that was before the Constitutional Court

revolved around the legality of a 258 million baht donation

($8.3 million) from the cement giant TPI Polene, whose

owner Prachai Liewphairat is a staunch opponent of

Thaksin.

One of the video clips purports to expose a private talk between Phasit Sakdanarong, secretary of the Constitutional

Court's president, and Wirat Romyen, a Democrat Party MP

who was in the party's legal team.

The meeting took place

at a restaurant in Bangkok during the trial for the alleged

misuse of funds. After the clips had been circulated, the

court dismissed the case on a technicality.

100

It found the

ECT had failed to submit the case to the court within fifteen

days of being notified. About two weeks later, it dismissed the second case, involving TPI Polene on similar

grounds, finding that the ECT had failed to initiate litigation

properly.

101

On 12 April 2010, the ECT commissioners recommended the

two cases be forwarded to the Office of the Attorney-General,

starting the legal proceedings against the Democrat Party.

"Democrats under fire after ruling", Bangkok Post, 13 April 2010.

See the clip of the conversation at www.youtube.com/watch?

v=k4095iNv-gY.

100

"Democrats off the hook", Bangkok Post, 30 November 2010.

101

"Democrat case thrown out", Bangkok Post, 10 December 2010.

The Constitutional Court rulings reinforced the perception

that "double standards" were being applied. Thai Rak Thai,

a political party formed by Thaksin, was dissolved by the

court in 2007 for violating election laws and its successor,

the PPP, was subsequently disbanded on similar grounds in

December 2008.

The Red Shirts have long complained that no legal action

was taken against Yellow Shirts who seized the two Bangkok airports in 2008, while UDD leaders are facing trial

and were detained for nine months before being granted bail.

There has been some progress in legal cases against the

PAD in early 2011. The police finalised its long-delayed

investigation into the PAD's airport seizure and forwarded

the case to the prosecutors on 18 March 2011. National

Police Commander Gen.Wichien Photphosri recommended

that fifteen PAD leaders be prosecuted for terrorism, including Sondhi and Chamlong Srimuang.

102

This case has

been highly politicised as reflected in the frequent change

of investigation teams. Also in March, the Civil Court ordered thirteen PAD leaders to pay 522 million baht ($17.2

million) plus interest to compensate Airports of Thailand

for the damage caused by their closure.

103

These latest development may somewhat reduce perceptions of the uneven application of the law held by many Red Shirts.

The court's treatment of rank-and-file protestors is also

problematic. In a widely-cited case, a Criminal Court judge

sentenced 51-year-old Yellow Shirt supporter Pricha Trijaroon to three years in prison on 16 August 2010 for attempted murder. Pricha was among thousands of Yellow

Shirt protesters who clashed with police outside the parliament on 7 October 2008. He was found guilty of delib-

102

Investigation on the airport seizure has been carried out under the leadership of three national police chiefs. The head of

the investigation team changed three times in 2008 and 2009

under Police Chief Gen. Phatcharawat Wongsuwan. The two

previous heads of investigation – Gen. Jongrak Juthanond and

Lt.Gen. Wutthi Phuavej – resigned, saying they were under severe pressure from the PAD and the UDD. In November 2010,

the investigation team led by Lt.Gen. Somyot Phumphanmuang

finalised its investigation and submitted recommendations to

national police commander that 113 individuals and the satellite

television ASTV station, owned by a PAD leader Sondhi, be

prosecuted. The investigation team recommended 25 PAD

leader be charged with terrorism. The police chief dropped terrorism charges against ten leaders, including Foreign Minister

Kasit Piromya. These ten will still be charged, along with 94

others, for violating aviation law during their alleged raid on

Suvarnabhumi Airport's control tower. Crisis Group interview,

Lt.Gen. Somyot Phumphanmuang, head of the investigation

team, Bangkok, 1 April 2011; "อัพเดทคดีพันธมิตรยึดสนามบินสอบมาราธอน 3

 ป สงอัยการ", มติชน, 20 มีนาคม 2554 ["Update PAD's airport seizure, case

forwarded to the prosecutors after three years of investigation",

Matichon, 20 March 2011].

103

The PAD plans to appeal the verdict. "PAD leaders told to

pay B552m airport damages", Bangkok Post, 26 March 2011. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 13

erately driving a pickup truck into five police officers, some

of whom were seriously injured. The court gave him a

suspended sentence of two years.

104

The same court sentenced several Red Shirts to jail terms of six months to one

year for such less serious offences such as violating the

emergency decree by attending protests.

105

In December 2010, the Criminal Court handed down an

important ruling which appears to be the first case in which

Yellow Shirt protesters were sentenced to jail for criminal

acts. The court sentenced 84 PAD guards, dubbed "Sriwichai warriors", who raided the state-run NBT television

station in August 2008, to jail terms ranging from nine to 30

months.

106

This ruling could send a signal that the law applies to everyone, regardless of their political affiliation.

Another concern is the use of the lèse majesté provisions

of the Criminal Code. Article 112 prescribes penalties from

three to fifteen years in prison for those who defame, insult or threaten the King, Queen, the Heir-apparent or the

Regent. This law has affected freedom of expression and

stifled debate on the role of the monarchy in politics. There

has been a significant increase in these cases in recent years.

A scholar of Thai studies who has carried out extensive

research on the issue noted that prosecutions climbed

dramatically after the 2006 coup. There were 30 new lèse

majesté cases in 2006, 126 in 2007, 77 in 2008 and 164 in

2009 (the highest numbers ever recorded in one year). From

1992 to 2005, the average number of new cases each year

was a little over five. Prior to 2005, the conviction rate for

lèse majesté cases in Lower Court in Thailand was 94 per

cent. If this rate holds for decisions handed down between

2006 and 2009, it would mean that there may have been,

or still are, hundreds of Thais in jail for such an offence,

serving terms that may range from one and a half to

eighteen years.

107

104

"ศาลส่ังจําคุกพธม.พยายามฆาขับรถชนตร. 3  ปไมเคยรับโทษรอลงอาญา 2  ป",

มติชนออนไลน, 16 สิงหาคม 2553 ["Court hands two-year suspended sentence for PAD attempting to kill police", Matichon Online, 16

August 2011].

105

Crisis Group telephone interview, Anond Nampha, lawyer

defending criminal cases for Red Shirts, 4 April 2011. Also see

"เปดจดหมาย นปช. ถึงผูพิพากษาท่ัวประเทศ", ประชาไท, 31 มกราคม 2554 ["Disclosing UDD letter to judges across the country", Prachatai, 31

January 2011]. Phongthep Thepkanchana, a former judge and

justice minister under the Thaksin administration, wrote about

the court's treatment of the UDD and PAD on his Facebook page

on 24 August 2010.

106

"84 PAD guards jailed for 2008 NBT television raid", Bangkok Post, 31 December 2010.

107

Statistics gathered by David Streckfuss, an independent

scholar based in Khon Kaen, made available to Crisis Group.

Also see David Streckfuss, "The Intricacies of Lese-Majesty: A

Comparative Study of Imperial Germany and Modern Thailand",

in Soren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager (eds.), Saying the UnsayThaksin and the Red Shirts have been accused of trying to

overthrow the monarchy, a charge they have repeatedly

denied. Several Red Shirt supporters have been prosecuted

for lèse majesté. Surachai Danwathananusorn, leader of

the Red Siam – a faction disowned by the UDD – was

arrested in February 2011 for allegedly making an antimonarchy remark on 18 December 2010 in front of thousands of people in Bangkok.

108

Lèse majesté charges can

also be pressed for internet postings – at times holding online

forum moderators responsible – using the 2007 Computer

Crimes Act.

109

In March 2011, a person who designed a

Red Shirt-aligned website was convicted and sentenced

to thirteen years in prison for a lèse majesté offence.

110

Jiranuch Premchaiporn, director of Prachatai news website, is accused of ten different violations under the Computer Crimes Act for allegedly failing to remove messages

criticising the monarchy. Each count carries a maximum

penalty of five years in prison.

111

The vagueness of the law allows it to be easily misused.

The charge can be filed by anyone against anyone. In

some cases, it is used to discredit political opponents. The

law should be amended, severe penalties reduced and authority to accuse an individual of violating the law limited to

prosecutors. Such an amendment would create an atmosphere more conducive to open and sincere discussion about

the monarchy's role in a democratic society.

Thai civil society groups have campaigned for the abolition

of Article 112. Prominent legal scholar Worajet Phakirat,

who teaches law at Thammasat University, argues that,

able: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand (Copenhagen,

2010), pp. 123-124; and David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in

Thailand: Defamation, treason and lèse majesté (London and

New York, 2011), pp. 111-112 and 205.

108

"จับสุรชัย แซดาน หมิ่นกษัตริย", ขาวสด, 23 กุมภาพันธ 2554 ["Surachai Saedan

arrested for lèse majesté", Khao Sod, 23 February 2011].

109

On the use of the Computer Crimes Act in relation to lèse

majesté offences, see "Situational Report on Control and Censorship of Online Media, through the Use of Laws and the Imposition of Thai State Policies", iLaw Project, 8 December 2010.

110

On 15 March 2011, the court sentenced Thanthawut Thaweewarodomkul, web designer of Nor Por Cho USA (UDD

USA), to ten years in jail for posting a message that violated

Article 112. He was also given another three years' imprisonment for not removing a lèse majesté comment posted on his

website – an offence under the Computer Crime Act.

111

Prachatai estimates that in 2008, an average of 2,500 new

comments were posted each day on the site. Jiranuch was arrested and charged in March and April 2009 for comments

posted on Prachatai between April and August 2008. Prachatai

later closed down its webboard due to its inability to monitor

new comments. Amnesty International has called on Thai authorities to drop charges against Jiranuch, arguing the prosecution infringes on freedom of expression. See "Thailand: Trial of

Web Forum Moderator Jeopardises Freedom of Expression", press

release, Amnesty International, 10 February 2011. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 14

apart from the actual law, the judiciary's interpretation of

the provision is a problem because of their views of absolute monarchy, which was abolished in 1932, and the current

regime of constitutional monarchy. He argues that while a

law that protects the dignity of the head of state is still

needed, this particular provision should be amended to make

it more compatible with the principles guiding a democracy.

The current application of this law prevents open discussion of the role of the monarchy in Thai politics.

112

B. GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF MEDIA

The difference in the government's treatment of the media

aligned with the UDD and the PAD is stark. Community

radio stations, satellite television and the internet have

been used by both the PAD and the UDD to communicate,

educate (or indoctrinate) and mobilise supporters. The government has severely cracked down or harassed the media

aligned with the Red Shirts. During the state of emergency,

the Centre for the Resolution of Emergency Situations

(CRES), an ad hoc body set up to oversee the state of

emergency and run by the military, was granted sweeping

powers to shut down media deemed a threat to national

security.

113

It pulled the PTV satellite station, which live

broadcasted the UDD protest, off the air. The CRES also

imposed blanket censorship on thousands of Red Shirtaffiliated websites.

114

At least 38 community radio

stations, which were crucial to communication and mobilisation in the provinces, were shut down.

115

Shortly after

the crackdown four Red Shirt-aligned magazines – Voice

of Taksin, Truth Today, Thai Red News, and Wiwatha

[Debate] – were banned.

112

See วรเจตนภาคีรัตน, "  ปญหาของกฎหมายหมิ่นประมาทพระมหากษัตริย", ประกาศนิ

ติราษฎรฉบับที่ 16, 13 มีนาคม 2011 [Worajet Phakirat, "The problem of

lèse majesté law", Nitiraj statement Number 16, 13 March 2011],

available at www.enlightened-jurists.com/blog/24.

113

The emergency decree's section 9 (3) stipulates that the government is allowed to prohibit any publications and means of

communication that could affect state stability and public order.

114

The emergency decree allowed the CRES to bypass normal

procedures for blocking websites as stipulated in the 2007 Computer Crime Act. See "Situational Report on Control and Censorship of Online Media, through the Use of Laws and the Imposition of Thai State Policies", iLaw Project, 8 December 2010.

115

After the May crackdown, dozens of armed soldiers raided

offices of community radio stations in several provinces and

seized their transmitters. According to the Committee to Campaign for Media Reform, at least 38 community radio stations

in thirteen provinces were closed down and nine stations were

pressured to stop broadcasting in four months after the government declared the state of emergency on 7 April 2010 and

49 people were charged. See "ประเทศไทย 'ความเห็นตาง' คือ อาชญากรรม",

คณะกรรมการรณรงคเพื่อการปฎิรูปสื่อ, 19 กันยายน 2553 ["Thailand: Where

thinking differently is a crime", Campaign for Popular Media

Reform, 19 September 2010].

Some Red Shirt media outlets have since reopened but continue to face harassment. Another satellite station called

"Asia Update" was set up in July 2010 to replace PTV.

116

New Red Shirt magazines resurfaced on newsstands a

couple of months after the crackdown although the authorities have tried to stop their publication. Harassment of the

printers of the new Red Power magazine by the authorities

forced it to relocate printing to Cambodia.

117

With the end of

the state of emergency, the authorities can no longer impose blanket censorship on websites but they continue to

block individual sites using the 2007 Computer Crime Act.

118

Authorities have tried to stop community radio stations

from reopening or have pressured them to tone down

their content. In Chiang Mai, the community radio station

of the Rak Chiang Mai 51 group was allowed to resume

broadcasting in November 2010 after agreeing to follow

instructions from the military; the hosts have noticeably

toned down their language.

119

In the North East, the Red

Shirts have played cat and mouse with the authorities by

concealing the radio-frequencies of the new stations or

broadcasting from a mobile location.

120

Even absent the

emergency decree, the authorities exploited legal loopholes to shut down the Red Shirt radio stations. One tied

to the Red Shirt Khon Kaen 51 group was shut down weeks

after the state of emergency was lifted on grounds that it had

no temporary license.

121

While the Red Shirt media has been suppressed, no action

has been taken against its Yellow Shirt equivalent. Legal

action should be taken again those disseminating hate speech

or instigating violence. But the law should be applied evenly,

regardless of political affiliation and basic rights to freedom of information and expression must be upheld without

116

"'เอเชีย อัพเดต' แนวรบใหมเพื่อไทย", ขาวสด, 6 กรกฎาคม 2553 ["Asia Update:

Pheu Thai's new fighting tactic", Khao Sod, 6 July 2011].

117

After authorities ordered the printer to close down, claiming

the site did not meet requirements of the Factory Act, other

Thai printers were reportedly too scared to print the magazine.

Crisis Group interview, Somyot Prueksakasemsuk, Red

Power's editor, 26 February 2011.

118

Under the 2007 Computer Crime Act, officials from the ministry of information and communication technology can block

websites, subject to court approval.

119

Crisis Group interviews, members of Rak Chiang Mai 51

group, Chiang Mai, 18 November 2010.

120

Crisis Group interviews, army officer and Red Shirts, Khon

Kaen, 23-25 December 2010.

121

Crisis Group interview, Red Shirt radio host, Khon Kaen, 24

December 2010. Some 6,600 community radio stations have

been granted temporary licenses for trial broadcasting periods

from the National Telecommunications Commission. While more

than 1,000 community stations are believed to be operating without

the licenses, authorities appear to have singled out Red Shirt

stations. The Red Shirt Khon Kaen 51 group later re-opened

after buying a station with a temporary license. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 15

discrimination. In any circumstance, shutting down media

violates the 2007 Constitution.

122

VI. FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS

The general election, expected in June or July, is an opportunity for Thailand to use its parliamentary system to address

some of the political differences behind the mass demonstrations that ended in violence in 2010. The Red Shirts took

to the streets to protest against what they perceived to be

an "illegitimate" government. They charged that after the

PPP was disbanded in December 2008, the military had

twisted the arms of smaller parties to switch sides and

join with the second largest party, the Democrat Party, to

form a coalition government. Amid persistent coup rumours,

Abhisit is likely to dissolve parliament and advance to

general elections as quickly as possible. How the next

government is formed will likely be contentious and critical

to the stability of the country. Many analysts and observers

of Thai politics are pessimistic and predict that either UDD

or PAD supporters will soon return to the streets, whatever

the outcome of the polls.

A. GEARING UP FOR THE RACE

In early March 2011, Prime Minister Abhisit, after consulting with the ECT, announced that he expected to dissolve

the parliament in the first week of May.

123

By law, elections

must be conducted within 45 to 60 days. As a result of the

amendment of the Constitution, there are several changes

to the polls. Compared to the 2007 election: 1) the number

of MPs elected from party lists has increased from 80 to

125; 2) votes for party list seats will be counted nationally

and no longer divided into eight regions; 3) there is now no

minimum threshold of 5 per cent of votes to be eligible

for party list seats; 4) the numbers of constituency MPs have

been reduced from 400 to 375; and 5) legislators will be

elected from single-member constituencies rather than multimember ones.

124

The Democrat Party stands to gain most from the new rules.

In the last general election, it was a close race between it

122

Article 45 of the 2007 Constitution allows the government to

block the media from presenting information or expressing

opinions if a special law is imposed for the purpose of maintaining national security and public order. However, it states

that media shall not be closed down under any circumstances.

123

"PM announces dissolution in early May", Bangkok Post, 12

March 2011.

124

See "รัฐธรรมนูญแหงราชอาณาจักรไทย แกไขเพิ่มเติม (ฉบับที่ 1) พุทธศักราช 2554",

ราชกิจจานุเบกษา, 3 มีนาคม 2554 ["Amendment of the Constitution of the

Kingdom of Thailand (Number 1) 2011", Royal Gazette, 4

March 2011].

and the PPP for the party list seats. The Democrat Party won

33 party list seats, while the PPP gained 34. In the then

multi-member constituencies, the PPP won 199 seats and

the Democrat Party 131.

125

If the previous election's result is

any indication, increasing the number of party list MPs

could maximise the ruling party's seats in the overall polls.

The reduction of constituency seats is likely to be to the

disadvantage of the Pheu Thai Party. Calculations based

on the population ratios and the numbers of incoming MPs

show that sixteen of the 25 seats being cut from the constituencies are in the North and the North East and only four

seats are scrapped in the Democrat Party's stronghold of

the South.

126

The Democrat Party has also tried to win over the poor by

implementing its own "populist" policy, dubbed "Pracha

Wiwat" (progress of the people). In January 2011, the

government announced a nine-point policy that included

the expansion of the social security scheme to cover a total

of 24 million workers in the informal economy; low-interest

loans for taxi and motorcycle taxi drivers and street vendors;

registration of motorcycle taxi drivers to stamp out the

mafia's influence; and free electricity to low-use households.

127

These schemes aim to meet the day-to-day needs of

the poor, who have been Thaksin's base. The taxi and motorcycle taxi drivers targeted by these programs are among

the staunchest supporters of the ousted prime minister.

The return to single member constituencies, first introduced

with the 1997 Constitution, will make small and mediumsized parties more competitive. As the electoral districts

will be smaller, candidates will be more able to run effective

door-to-door campaigns. The reputation of individuals

seeking office rather than just their party's popularity could

carry more weight with voters. This will be particularly

critical in the North East, where the Bhumjaithai Party, led

by Thaksin-turncoat politician Newin, will be in cut-throat

competition with the Pheu Thai Party. Since Thaksin's popularity in the impoverished region remains strong, a smaller

constituency will boost the chances of Bhumjaithai

candidates defeating their Pheu Thai rivals.

128

If Bhumjaithai

does well in the North East, this could also contribute to

strengthening the Democrat Party's victory.

While Thaksin and his de facto party remain popular, Pheu

Thai has long faced difficulties finding a strong leader.

125

ECT website (www.ect.go.th/newweb/th/election/index4.

php).

126

Crisis Group telephone interview, senior member of Pheu Thai

Party, 14 March 2011.

127

"มอบ 9 ประชาวิวัฒนเปนของขวัญปใหม", คมชัดลึก, 9 มกราคม 2554 ["Give nine

'prachawiwat' policies as new year's gift", Khom Chad Luek, 9

January 2011].

128

Crisis Group interview, senior politician of Bhumjaithai Party,

Udon Thani, 29 December 2010. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 16

Mingkhwan Saengsuwan, a public relations strategist

who has long worked for Thaksin, is believed to have the

best chance to head the party for the forthcoming polls.

Mingkhwan was a deputy prime minister for economic affairs in the Samak government. Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's youngest sister is also mentioned as a potential candidate for the party's top job. Whoever becomes the official

leader, Thaksin will certainly remain as a back-seat driver.

He continues to design overall strategies for the election

campaign, while Mingkhwan and the party's economic

team are working on its economic policies.

129

Thaksin is

reaching out directly to serving MPs and prospective candidates without going through faction leaders as he had done

in the past. He seems to have learned a bitter lesson when

Newin defected with a whole faction of the party.

130

The Red Shirts will throw their weight behind Pheu Thai,

although its relationship with the activists has not always

been harmonious.

131

Thida, the acting UDD leader, said

during a rally in March 2011 that the movement is using a

two-pronged strategy; fighting on the street and in the

parliament.

132

The seven UDD leaders recently released

on bail have expressed their intention to run as candidates

under Pheu Thai.

133

The party has made room for ten UDD

leaders to run on its party list and another ten as constituency candidates.

134

As the stakes are high, the forthcoming elections could be

violent. Three separate attacks against local politicians on 2

March 2011 that killed one and left two seriously injured,

served as an early warning and prompted the national police

chief to set up special units nationwide to prevent violence

129

Crisis Group interview, Phichet Chueamuangphan, senior

member of Pheu Thai Party, Bangkok, 25 February 2011.

130

Crisis Group interviews, journalist and political scientist, Bangkok, 22 February and 1 March 2011. On the defection, see fn. 30.

131

An election strategist expressed concerns that fielding Red

Shirts as candidates in large numbers could cause problems with

Pheu Thai supporters who do not see eye to eye with the movement. Red Shirts often complain about Pheu Thai MPs whom

they accuse of being distant and of rarely supporting their struggle. Thaksin reportedly intervened to mend fences and told the

party's executives to recognise the contributions of the Red

Shirt leaders. Crisis Group interviews, Red Shirt leaders in

Chiang Mai and the North East, November-December 2010;

and Pheu Thai senior member, Bangkok, 9 February 2011;

"Pheu Thai certain to restrict role of red shirts", Bangkok Post, 3

March 2011.

132

"Red Shirts urged to give their vote to Pheu Thai", Bangkok

Post, 13 March 2011.

133

"มติ 7 แกนนํานปช. ลงสัดสวน พท. หวังเอกสิทธิ์ไมถูกคุมขัง", กรุงเทพธุรกิจ, 24

กุมภาพันธ 2554 ["Seven UDD leaders agree to run as Pheu Thai's

party list candidate, hoping to be granted immunity from detention", Krungthep Thurakit, 24 February 2011].

134

Nattaya Chetchotiros, "Red Shirts get green light to enter

politics", Bangkok Post, 28 February 2011.

in the forthcoming polls.

135

While the initial investigation

indicated that the attacks were likely to be linked to local

rather than national politics, these incidents showed some

may use violence to settle their disputes or eliminate their

political rivals. Those who have studied election violence

in Thailand note that local politics have often been more

brutal partly because of the low-level of public scrutiny.

136

The constitutional amendment that created smaller constituencies with more door-to-door canvassing could expose

candidates and canvassers to greater risks of violence.

Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts may obstruct the campaigns

of politicians they oppose, as they have done in the past.

Having called for a fresh election, Red Shirts may have

less compelling reasons to try to derail the polls. The Yellow

Shirts seem more inclined to cause disruption. The UDD

and PAD should publicly commit to supporting a peaceful election and work towards this goal by toning down

their rhetoric and restraining those within their ranks who

might try to obstruct the polls. In other countries at risk of

electoral violence, the voluntary signing of agreed electoral

codes of conduct, often brokered by the electoral management body or other third parties, has helped moderate the

behaviour of candidates and their supporters.

137

If used in

Thailand, voluntary pacts will be more effective if they are

backed by the two mass movements.

Domestic, regional and international monitoring of the

campaign and on election day could also encourage civil

behaviour and enhance the credibility of the polls.

138

Foreign

135

On that day, the mayor of Bangbuathong district in Nonthaburi was shot dead, a bomb blew off the legs of the head of the

Tambon (sub-district) Administrative Organisation (TAO) in Prajinburi, and a shooting seriously injured a canvasser of the

Bhumjaithai Party in Rachaburi. The elder brother of the slain

mayor was slated to run as a Pheu Thai candidate in the upcoming polls. "ฆานายกบางบัวทองถึงบึ้มถลมหัวคะแนน ตั้ง ฉก. ปราบมือปนรับศึกเ

ลือกตั้งเลือด",ขาวสด, 13 มีนาคม 2554 ["From killing of Bangbuathong's

mayor to death of canvassers; police set up special force to oversee bloody polls", Khao Sod, 13 March 2011].

136

Crisis Group interview, Thai political scientist, Bangkok, 1

March 2011.

137

See Electoral Code of Conduct Second Round Presidential Election Haiti, 2011. An English translation of this code is available

at www.ndi.org/files/Haiti-code-of-conduct-eng.pdf. Similar

codes of conduct have been signed in countries including Namibia, South Africa, Macedonia, the occupied Palestinian territories, Ethiopia, Kenya and Cambodia.

138

However, observation of the first post-coup elections in 2007

was not highly effective. The Asian Network for Free Elections

(ANFREL), a regional election monitoring group, observed the

2007 elections and concluded that local NGOs were more focused on monitoring on election day itself rather than assessing

the fairness of the pre- or post-election environment. Local

monitors were often inexperienced and inadequately trained.

While the ECT has a substantial amount of budget for local

monitors, ANFREL noted that some election commissioners Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 17

assistance could be helpful in this regard. International

monitoring should also be encouraged and the ECT should

not block it as did during the previous election. In 2007,

the European Union was unable to deploy the observation

mission it had offered because the ECT refused to sign

the necessary agreement for fear that it would impinge on

national sovereignty.

139

In the interests of enhancing the

legitimacy of the polls, all sides should support election

observation. Xenophobic reaction to electoral observation

by foreigners is counter-productive.

Irregularities in vote counting and the ECT's adjudication

of complaints in disputed constituencies could affect the

formation of the new government. The ECT has the authority to issue "yellow cards" and "red cards" to candidates

against whom there is evidence of vote-buying.

140

If the

ECT is not even-handed and impartial, it could reinforce

the belief, particularly among Red Shirt supporters, that

"double standards" are being applied. Electoral fraud and

vote-rigging could also trigger protests.

141

Despite the prime minister's announcement of the timeframe for elections, there is speculation that a military coup

or a more subtle "silent coup" could derail the polls. There

has been some speculation that if election commissioners

were pressured to resign, creating political deadlock, Article

7 of the constitution might then be invoked to form a royallyappointed government.

142

The ECT currently comprises

five commissioners and requires at least three commissioners to have quorum. In March 2011, election commissioner

Sodsri Satayatham expressed her desire to resign.

143

Sodsri

later said she would likely stay on, but the prospect of her

did not have positive attitude toward them. "Thailand: Elections to the House of Representatives 23rd December 2007",

The Asian Network for Free Elections, March 2008, pp. 34-35.

139

Ibid, p. 33.

140

The yellow card is issued when there is no evidence that the

candidates were directly involved with, or aware of, the electoral fraud. The EC would annul the result and allow the person to

run again in a by-election. Those candidates found to have directly

participated in fraud would be given a red card and disqualified.

141

Crisis Group interview, political scientist at Thammasat

University, Bangkok, 1 March 2011.

142

Article 7 states that if no provision in the constitution is applicable, a decision may be taken in accordance with traditional

practice in a democratic regime with the king as head of the

state. When the 2006 snap elections yielded an inconclusive

result because of the opposition parties' boycott, the PAD and

its allies proposed petitioning the king to appoint an interim

prime minister under the terms of Article 7. At the time, the

Democrat Party supported the PAD proposal. In an April 2006

speech to Administrative Court judges, King Bhumibol stated

that Article 7 did not empower him to appoint a prime minister.

143

"Jaded Sodsri says she wants to find new job", Bangkok

Post, 25 March 2011. Sodsri said she was exhausted and concerned about being targeted in lawsuits. She had applied for a

job at the government's Legal Reform Commission.

resignation increased speculation that the PAD would call

for Article 7 to be invoked to "clean up" politics.

144

In a

media interview, Sodsri confirmed that she had heard from

some army officers of a plan to form a royally-appointed

government.

145

Senior army commanders deny they will

stage a coup and dismiss the idea that they want the king to

appoint a prime minister.

146

B. POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS

Anger or any sense of injustice over how the new government is formed could be the rallying cry for renewed mass

protests. The legitimacy of Abhisit's coalition government

was one of the UDD's key issues during their demonstrations. Independent observers, opinion surveys as well as

politicians themselves suggest another coalition is likely.

147

How the coalition is formed will be crucial to the new government's legitimacy. Pheu Thai senior members expect

the party to win no less than 233 seats, the number that

the disbanded PPP received in the 2007 election. It would

still be an uphill struggle for the party to win an outright

majority.

148

The Democrat Party hopes to get between

200 and 230 seats.

149

ABAC Poll, an opinion survey conducted by Assumption University, found that the election

would be a close race between the two major parties. It

predicted Pheu Thai Party would beat the Democrat Party

in Bangkok and in the North East, while the ruling party's

144

"EC's Sodsri vows to stay for upcoming election", The Nation, 28 March 2011. "สนธิสาบสงการเมืองสัตวนรก – มติพธม. โนโหวต ใหกมม.

งดลงเลือกตั้ง", ASTV ผูจัดการออนไลน, 24 มีนาคม 2554 ["Sondhi – abolishing

politics of hellish monsters – PAD agrees on 'no-vote' and calls

for New Politics Party to boycott polls", ASTV Manager Online,

24 March 2011].

145

"สัมภาษณพิเศษ: สดศรีสวมบทตัวประกอบ ตะลุยเปดโปงแผนลับ … ปฎิวัติเงียบ", มติชน,

4 เมษายน 2554 ["Exclusive interview: Sodsri plays supporting actress,

revealing secret plan to stage silent coup", Matichon, 4 April 2011].

146

Supreme Commander Gen. Songkitti Jaggabatara made

these remarks at a 6 April 2011 press conference in the presence of the commanders of the army, navy and air forces.

"Military leaders unified against a coup", Bangkok Post, 6

April 2011.

147

Crisis Group interview, Kiat Sittheeamorn, Thailand Trade

Representative, Bangkok, 3 March 2011; and Phaijit Sriworakhan, Pheu Thai senior member, 9 February 2011. Kiat is expected to run as a party list candidate for the Democrat Party.

Also see, "โพลชี้กรุง-ปชป. วูบ พท. แซงนําคะแนน รวมทั้งปท", ขาวสด, 4 เมษายน 2554

["Poll suggests Democrat's popularity in Bangkok dropped,

Pheu Thai gains more support; close race at national level",

Khao Sod, 4 April 2011].

148

Thai newspaper Matichon cited Pheu Thai sources as saying

that Thaksin told party members in a teleconference that he expected the party to get more than 270 seats. "4 ทัพตบเทาล่ันไม 'ปฏิวัติ'",

มติชน, 6 เมษายน 2554 ["Army assures no coup", Matichon, 6 April 2011].

149

Crisis Group interview, Sathit Pitutaecha, Democrat Party's

executive member and deputy spokesman, Bangkok, 3 April 2011. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 18

stronghold in the South remained solid and it would likely

gain more votes in the Central region.

150

The most contentious scenario is if Pheu Thai has a plurality

of seats but not an absolute majority. The smaller parties'

roles would then be pivotal in determining the government.

Bhumjaithai and Chart Thai Pattana, two medium-sized

parties, were quick to recognise their potential leverage in

building a coalition; combined, the two parties are likely to

win more than 100 seats. They signed an electoral pact on 14

March, agreeing to jointly decide their post-election future.

151

The UDD leaders say they will respect the results even if the

Democrat Party wins, provided the polls are free and fair.

However, the Red Shirts have expressed serious doubts

regarding the ECT's impartiality and believe the military

will try to manipulate voters as has happened during previous elections.

152

If the Pheu Thai Party emerges as the

largest party but does not form the government, it could be

grounds for the Red Shirts to return to the streets in full force.

Although there is no specific provision in the constitution

barring the second largest party from forming a coalition

government, its democratic credentials and legitimacy

would be readily challenged.

Another possibility is that Pheu Thai wins enough seats to

lead a new government. Though the Preah Vihear dispute

has failed to garner wide public support, one should not

underestimate the possibility of the Yellow Shirts regaining

momentum and returning to the streets if this happens. They

would oppose a "proxy" Thaksin government.

The government that emerges from the horse-trading

needs to have sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of the Thai

public to reduce the likelihood of mass protests. There are

no fixed rules for coalition-making – nor should there be –

but it might be possible to head off post-election disputes

if political parties try to build a consensus on how a coalition

could be formed in full view of the public. Some suggest

150

The ABAC poll surveyed opinions of some 5,200 respondents

in seventeen provinces between 25 March and 2 April 2011. See

"โพลชี้กรุง-ปชป. วูบพท. แซงนําคะแนนรวมทั้งปท",ขาวสด, 4 เมษายน 2554 ["Poll suggests

Democrat's popularity in Bangkok dropped, Pheu Thai gains more

support; close race at national level", Khao Sod, 4 April 2011].

151

"สัตยาบัน ภท – ชทพ. กาวแรกของขั้วใหม?", มติชน, 16 มีนาคม 2554 ["Bhumjaithai-Chart Thai Pattana pact signing- first step of new political camp?", Matichon, 16 March 2011].

152

Crisis Group telephone interview, Kokaew Phikunthong, UDD

leader, 6 April 2011. ANFREL documented attempts by the military to pressure voters and instruct its own personnel not vote

for the PPP. See "Thailand: Elections to the House of Representatives 23rd December 2007", The Asian Network for Free Elections, March 2008, pp. 29-31.

152

Ibid, p. 33.

the way to make the process more transparent is to encourage parties to openly state their positions ahead of time.

153

VII. CONCLUSION

The prospects of resolving the protracted political conflict

in Thailand anytime soon are dim. Little has been done to

bring about genuine reconciliation. The Red Shirts do not

believe that a government that was party to the conflict can

ensure accountability for the bloody crackdown in AprilMay 2010. While elections are not a magic wand to resolve

these problems, Thai citizens deserve the opportunity to

indicate their wishes at the ballot box. The polls should not

be derailed.

How the forthcoming elections are conducted and how the

new government is formed will be pivotal to determining

the post-election political landscape. Manipulation of the

polls and formation of the new government by the royalist

establishment could again trigger mass demonstrations.

All efforts should be made to ensure that the elections take

place and are free, fair and peaceful so as to minimise disputes over the results. The PAD and UDD supporters should

not obstruct the campaigns of their political opponents.

Even if the elections are deemed generally credible, it will

be a challenge for all sides to accept the results. The UDD

says it is willing to accept the results of a free and fair election even if the Democrat Party emerges as the largest party.

The PAD and traditional elites are unlikely to tolerate a

"proxy" government led by Thaksin-supported Pheu Thai

Party. Thailand is likely to face continuing mass protests,

which have become increasingly violent, until the establishment and elected politicians agree on a new social

contract on power sharing as well as the place of traditional

elites in a democratic country. Without compromise, the protracted conflict will continue, only deepening polarisation.

Bangkok/Brussels, 11 April 2011

153

Crisis Group interview, Thai political scientist, Bangkok, 3

March 2011. Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°121, 11 April 2011 Page 19

APPENDIX A

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some

130 staff members on five continents, working through

field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and

resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams

of political analysts are located within or close by countries

at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict.

Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis

Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly

bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of

play in all the most significant situations of conflict or

potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed

widely by email and made available simultaneously on the

website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely

with governments and those who influence them, including

the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate

support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures

from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the

media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports

and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers

around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former

European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher

Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its

President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been

Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human

Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal

Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels,

with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is

based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in

London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing.

The organisation currently operates nine regional offices

(in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta,

Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in fourteen additional locations (Baku, Bangkok,

Beirut, Bujumbura, Damascus, Dili, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo and

Seoul). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of

actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa,

this includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,

Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia,

Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,

Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh,

Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka,

Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia,

Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle

East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran,

Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria

and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia,

Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.

Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of

governments, institutional foundations, and private sources.

The following governmental departments and agencies have

provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for

International Development, Australian Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development and

Research Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, European Commission, Finnish Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal

Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation

Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International

Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International

Development Agency, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, United Kingdom Department for International Development, United Kingdom Economic and Social Research

Council, U.S. Agency for International Development.

The following institutional and private foundations have provided funding in recent years: Carnegie Corporation of New

York, The Charitable Foundation, Clifford Chance Foundation, Connect U.S. Fund, The Elders Foundation, Henry Luce

Foundation, William& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Humanity

United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Jewish World Watch, Korea

Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Society Institute, Victor Pinchuk Foundation,

Ploughshares Fund, Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Rausing

Trust, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and VIVA Trust.

April 2011International Headquarters

149 Avenue Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium · Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 · Fax: +32 2 502 50 38

Email: brussels@crisisgroup.org

New York Office

420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2640, New York 10170 · Tel: +1 212 813 0820 · Fax: +1 212 813 0825

Email: newyork@crisisgroup.org

Washington Office

1629 K Street, Suite 450, Washington DC 20006 · Tel: +1 202 785 1601 · Fax: +1 202 785 1630

Email: washington@crisisgroup.org

London Office

48 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT · Tel: +44 20 7831 1436 · Fax: +44 20 7242 8135

Email: london@crisisgroup.org

Moscow Office

Belomorskaya st., 14-1 – Moscow 125195 Russia · Tel/Fax: +7-495-455-9798

Email: moscow@crisisgroup.org

Regional Offices and Field Representation

Crisis Group also operates out of over 25 different locations in Africa,

Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.

See www.crisisgroup.org for details.

www.crisisgroup.org

No comments:

เสธ.แดง (พลตรี ดร. ขัตติยะ สวัสดิผล)

มาตรา 112 ทำให้กษัตริย์สามารถผลาญชาติได้อย่างถูกต้องตามกฎหมาย

งบกษัตริย์อังกฤษ 2 พันล้าน ชาวบ้านยังโวย ชาวอังกฤษไม่ถูกจับ; งบกษัตริย์ไทย ร่วม 2 หมื่นล้าน ชาวบ้านโวย โดน 112, ถูกจับ ถูกเก็บเงียบ (ยังไม่รวมโครงการพระราชดำริอีกแสนล้าน และงบที่แอบแฝงในงบกลางสำนักนายกฯสูงถึง 3 แสนล้านบาท)

สั่งสอนให้ประชาชน “พอเพียง”, แต่...

การแก้ปัญหา ความยากลำบาก หาเช้าไม่พอกินค่ำ ของประชาชน

ราชวงศ์หัวใหม่ สงสารประชาชน มีความคิดก้าวหน้า - ลดภาษี สร้างงาน ส่งเสริมการลงทุน กระจายรายได้ ให้สิทธิเสรีภาพประชาชน เพื่อปกครองตนเอง, ราชวงศ์หัวเก่า เห็นแก่ตัว มีความคิดเต่าล้านปี - แข่งบุญแข่งวาสนามันแข่งกันไม่ได้ กูไม่รู้ว่ากูจะช่วยพวกมึงได้อย่างไร นอกจากจะขอแนะนำให้พวกมึงทำบุญให้มากๆ ชาติหน้าพวกมึงจะได้เกิดมาเป็นเจ้าคนนายคนอย่างพวกกู

บอกว่าอย่าเอาสถาบันกษัตริย์มายุ่งเกี่ยวกับการเมือง?, คงคิดว่าประชาชนเขาตาบอดกันหมด

นี่คือเหตุผลที่ ทำไมการปฎิวัติประชาธิปไตยเท่านั้น ที่จะทำให้ประเทศไทยเป็นประชาธิปไตยที่แท้จริงได้

คนเสื้อแดง และประชาชนไทยผู้รักประชาธิปไตย กำลังพัฒนาการต่อสู้ไปสู่การเปลี่ยนระบอบ

ทัศนะของพวกศักดินา - ประเทศไทยคือกรุงเทพฯ กรุงเทพฯคือประเทศไทย

ต่างจังหวัดคือพื้นที่ที่พวกไพร่อยู่ ไม่สำคัญ มีหน้าที่จ่ายภาษีอากรให้กรุงเทพฯ, ภายใต้ระบบศักดินา ต่างจังหวัดไม่มีวันเจริญ ประชาชนในชนบทไม่มีวันที่จะมีชีวิตความเป็นอยู่ที่ดีขึ้น

ยุทธศาสตร์-ยุทธวิธี ของพรรคเพื่อไทยในปัจจุบัน... สู้ไป-กราบศัตรูไป

ขอให้ได้อยู่เป็นรัฐบาลไปเรื่อยๆก็พอ แทนที่จะทำหน้าที่เป็นผู้แทนของประชาชน เพื่อผลประโยชน์ของเขา กลับเอามวลชนไปเป็นเครื่องต่อรองผลประโยชน์และความอยู่รอดของตัวเอง ประเทศชาติและประชาชนจะเสียหาย ก็ช่างมัน ถ้าเป็นแบบนี้ไปเรื่อยๆ มวลชนและแนวร่วมจะล้าและถอยหนี พรรคเพื่อไทยจะแพ้แน่นอน

ท่านนายกปู ท่านกลัวมือท่านจะเปื้อนเลือด

ความรับผิดชอบของท่านไม่ได้หมดไปในวินาทีที่เขาปลดท่านออกจากตำแหน่งนายก ความรับผิดชอบของท่านยังคงอยู่ต่อเนื่องไปถึงกรณีที่ ถ้าผู้ที่สนับสนุนท่านในปัจจุบัน ถูกจับคุม เข่นฆ่า หลังจากที่ท่านหมดความเป็นนายกแล้ว เลือดที่เปื้อนมือท่านจะเป็นเลือดของคนเหล่านั้น, สู้เถิดครับ ท่านหนีไม่พ้นการเป็นผู้นำของประชาชน

สงครามประชาชน ต้องสู้อย่างต่อเนื่อง ไม่รู้จักเหน็ดเหนื่อย ไม่มีความย่อท้อ ไม่มีคำว่าแพ้

พรรคเพื่อไทยจะสามารถพัฒนาไปเป็นพรรคการเมืองที่ก้าวหน้าและเข้มแข็งที่สุดในอนาคตได้

สงครามประชาชนเริ่มแล้ว สู้เพื่อชาติ สู้เพื่อประชาชน สู้เพื่อศักดิ์ศรีความเป็นมนุษย์ของเรา

ขยายมวลชนไปเรื่อยๆ นวดมันไปเรื่อยๆ... การขยายมวลชนเป็นสิ่งที่สำคัญที่สุดของการเปลี่ยนระบอบ

ได้เวลาสร้างชาติแล้ว...

โดยธรรมชาติ... ความเข้มแข็งของระบอบกษัตริย์ในประเทศไหนก็ตาม

ขึ้นอยู่กับความรักและความศรัทธาที่ประชาชนมีต่อระบอบนี้ ถ้าขาดปัจจัยเหล่านี้ ถึงแม้ว่าจะใช้กฎหมายที่ไม่เป็นธรรมหรืออาวุธมาบังคับประชาชน ระบอบนี้ก็จะไม่สามารถคงอยู่ได้ และจะถูกเปลี่ยนเป็นระบอบประชาธิปไตยในที่สุด

ผู้นำท่านใดที่มี อุดมการณ์เพื่อผลประโยชน์ของประชาชนเป็นหลัก

ปัจจุบันประเทศไทยปกครองภายใต้ระบอบเผด็จการกษัตริย์

ประชาชนไม่มีสิทธิในการปกครองตนเอง ซึ่งเป็นเหตุที่ทำให้เกิดความแตกแยกในชาติอย่างรุนแรง เป็นผลให้ประเทศชาติไม่สามารถพัฒนาให้เทียบเท่าประเทศเพื่อนบ้านได้ และประชาชนไทยส่วนมากยังยากจนอยู่

ภายใต้ ระบอบเผด็จการโบราณ - ทุนนิยมผูกขาด

เริ่มจากความพยายามที่จะทำลายตระกูลชินวัตร คนเสื้อแดง และฝ่ายประชาธิปไตย ให้ราบคาบแบบขุดรากถอนโคน

มาตรา 112 เป็นเครื่องมือที่สำคัญที่สุดของกลุ่มศักดินา

...จะมีหนึ่งนารีขี่ม้าขาว ควงคฑาสู่ดาวมุ่งความหวัง

พล.อ. ประยุทธ์ จันทร์โอชา ช่วงนี้เครียดมาก น่าจะลาพักซัก 2-3 วัน แล้วไปเที่ยวต่างจังหวัด

สงครามชิงอำนาจคืนของเผด็จการโบราณ, แม่ทัพ กองทัพหน้า - สุเทพ เทือกสุบรรณ

จะทำสงครามกับประชาชน... ลืมแล้วหรือ ที่เรียนมา

ทัศนะของพวกศักดินา - ประเทศไทยคือกรุงเทพฯ กรุงเทพฯคือประเทศไทย

นายกยิ่งลักษณ์ คุณทักษิณ และพรรคเพื่อไทย

เป้าหมายสูงสุด (ยุทธศาสตร์) ของคนเสื้อแดงและชาวไทยผู้รักประชาธิปไตยคือ

“ทหารจะทำรัฐประหารหรือไม่” เป็นคำถามที่น่าอัปยศอดสูที่สุดของทหารไทย

ระบบศักดินา (Feudal System) หมายถึง...

ระบบสังคมที่มีการแบ่งชนชั้น ซึ่งกำหนดสิทธิหน้าที่และฐานะของแต่ละบุคคลในสังคม จุดประสงค์ก็เพื่อควบคุมกำลังคนและแบ่งฐานะของบุคคลเป็นสำคัญ ผู้ควบคุมกำลังคนสูงสุด คือ พระมหากษัตริย์ รองลงมาได้แก่ ขุนนาง (ข้าราชการ) และผู้ถูกควบคุมคือ สามัญชนหรือไพร่

ยุทธศาสตร์ในปัจจุบัน... รัฐบาลต้องมาจากการเลือกตั้งเท่านั้น

ระวัง!! วันที่ ๙ ม.ค. นี้, จุดอ่อนของเผด็จการโบราณ, งมงาย เชื่อไสยศาสตร์มากเกินไป...

ถ้าเผด็จการโบราณใช้ทหารทาสออกมากระทำรัฐประหารต่อประชาชน

ถ้าเผด็จการโบราณใช้ทหารทาสกระทำรัฐประหารได้สำเร็จ

ท่านนายกปู... ท่านทำอะไรให้แก่ประชาชนที่มีลักษณะต่อต้านเผด็จการบ้าง

ภารกิจที่อัปยศอดสูของทหารไทยกลุ่มหลักก็คือ

ลิ่วล้อของฝ่ายเผด็จการโบราณมักจะออกมาข่มขู่ประชาชนไทยเสมอว่า

ประชาชนไทยมีความหวาดระแวงทหารไทย

เพราะที่ผ่านมา ทหารไทยยอมปล่อยให้ตัวเองถูกใช้เป็นเครื่องมือของเผด็จการโบราณในการ กดขี่ ข่มเหง คุกคาม ควบคุม จับขัง และเข่นฆ่า ประชาชนผู้บริสุทธิ์, หวังว่าทหารไทยในปัจจุบันและในอนาคต จะเป็นทหารอาชีพที่แท้จริงของประชาชนไทยทุกคน และไม่ยอมให้ตนเองตกเป็นเครื่องมือของเผด็จการโบราณ หรืออำนาจอิทธิพลกลุ่มหนึ่งกลุ่มใด

ประชาชนไทยต้องรู้จักปกป้องตนเอง

เผด็จการโบราณ และสุนัขรับใช้เครือข่ายของมันกำลังวางแผนที่จะเข่นฆ่าประชาชนไทย ด้วยยุทธศาสตร์-ยุทธวิธี ประหนึ่งว่าประชาชนไทยที่ต่อสู้เพื่อระบอบประชาธิปไตย เป็นศัตรูต่างชาติ

ถึงแม้ว่าจะมีการเปลี่ยนตัวหัวหน้าเผด็จการโบราณ ก็ไม่ได้หมายความว่าประชาชนจะได้รับประชาธิปไตย

ยังไม่พอที่ พวกศักดินามันเอาภาษีอากรที่มันขูดรีด จาก ชาวนา คนยากคนจน และคนชั้นกลาง

เพื่อที่จะไป บำรุงบำเรอพวกมัน และครอบครัวของพวกมัน, มันยังเอา ภาษีอากรเหล่านี้ไปจ้าง โจร อันธพาล ฆาตกร กบฏ เพื่อที่จะ สร้างสถานการณ์ให้มีการกดขี่ข่มเหง ชาวนา คนยากคนจน และคนชั้นกลางต่อไปอีกด้วย

หลักพื้นฐานที่สำคัญที่สุดของระบอบประชาธิปไตย หนึ่งคนมีหนึ่งเสียง... ไม่มีข้อยกเว้น

มันเกิดอะไรขึ้นในกรุงเทพฯ อันธพาล โจร ฆาตกร กลุ่มอิทธิพล และขบถ เต็มเมือง

รัฐธรรมนูญของประเทศญี่ปุ่น, หมวด ๑ พระจักรพรรดิ, มาตรา ๘ การอนุมัติเกี่ยวกับทรัพย์สินส่วนพระองค์

ท่านนายกปู… ออกมารับผิดชอบและทำหน้าที่เป็นผู้นำของประชาชนไทยตามที่พวกเขาเลือกคุณมาได้แล้ว

จะปล่อยให้พวกกบฏโจรมันทำลายชาติอยู่อีกทำไม ไม่ต้องกลัวหรอกว่าใครอยู่เบื้องหลังพวกมัน ประชาชนผู้รักประชาธิปไตยจะสูญเสียมากว่าที่ผ่านมาถ้าคุณไม่ทำอะไรเลย โดยมัวแต่จะหาทางรอดและผลประโยชน์ให้แก่ตัวเองและครอบครัว

เผด็จการโบราณ - โง่หรือฉลาด

ก่อนอนุมัติขบถ 19 ก.ย. 2549 - ประชาชนรักใคร่เต็มบ้านเต็มเมือง, หลังอนุมัติขบถ 19 ก.ย. 2549 ตามด้วยการ จับกุม เข่นฆ่า ลิดรอนสิทธิเสรีภาพของประชาชนอย่างต่อเนื่อง - ผล ประชาชนขยะแขยง เกลียดชัง เต็มบ้านเต็มเมือง

ปัจจุบัน การเปลี่ยนแปลงประเทศให้เป็นประชาธิปไตยที่แท้จริง

สงครามชิงอำนาจคืนของเผด็จการโบราณ, แม่ทัพ กองทัพหน้า - สุเทพ เทือกสุบรรณ

อย่าไว้ใจและอย่าประนีประนอมกับอำนาจเผด็จการโบราณอย่างเด็ดขาด...

กรณีกฎหมายนิรโทษกรรมฯ... พวกเราไม่โกรธคุณทักษิณหรอกครับ

พวกเราต้องทำภารกิจเพื่อประชาชนของเราต่อไป ไม่ว่าคุณทักษิณจะมาร่วมกับพวกเราหรือไม่ แต่ถ้าคุณทักษิณมาร่วมกับพวกเรา คุณทักษิณจะกลายเป็นรัฐบุรุษที่สำคัญที่สุดของประเทศไทย ชื่อ “ทักษิณ” และ ตระกูล “ชินวัตร” จะคงอยู่ในหัวใจของคนไทยทุกคน ตลอดกาล...

พวกเราต้องยึดถือวัฒนธรรมประชาธิปไตย ก่อนที่เราจะได้ประชาธิปไตย

ถึงแม้ว่าจะมีการเปลี่ยนตัวหัวหน้าเผด็จการโบราณ ก็ไม่ได้หมายความว่าประชาชนจะได้รับประชาธิปไตย

การเลือกตั้งภายใต้ระบอบเผด็จการโบราณ เป็นเพียงทางผ่านและบทเรียนที่ขมขื่นของประชาชนเท่านั้น...

โดยเฉพาะการที่รัฐบาลที่ประชาชนเลือกตั้งมากลับมีพฤติกรรมขัดขวางระบอบ ประชาธิปไตยเสียเอง! ที่สุดแล้ว ประชาชนจะได้ข้อสรุปว่า การเปลี่ยนระบอบเป็นเพียงหนทางเดียวเท่านั้นที่จะทำให้ประเทศเป็น ประชาธิปไตยที่แท้จริง

ยุทธวิธีของเผด็จการโบราณในความพยายามที่จะยึดอำนาจคืนก็คือ...

ประชาธิปไตยแบบไทยๆ ตระกูลที่รวยที่สุด... ไม่ต้องเสียภาษี

เผด็จการโบราณ เป็นสาเหตุแห่งความขัดแย้งของคนไทย

การเลือกตั้งภายใต้ระบอบเผด็จการโบราณ...

เป็นเพียงทางผ่านและบทเรียน ที่ขมขื่นของประชาชนเท่านั้น ที่สุดแล้ว ประชาชนจะได้ข้อสรุปว่า การเปลี่ยนระบอบเป็นเพียงหนทางเดียวเท่านั้นที่จะทำให้ประเทศเป็นระชาธิปไตย ที่แท้จริง

สภาปฏิรูปที่นายกยิ่งลักษณ์เสนอ...

ต้องมีตัวแทนที่ก้าวหน้าจากฝ่ายประชาชนเข้าร่วม และจะต้องเปิดโอกาสให้มีการพูดคุยถกเถียงกันทุกเรื่องรวมถึงการริดรอนเสรีภาพของประชาชนด้วยมาตรา 112 และการเข้ามาแทรกแซงทางการเมืองและทางเศรษฐกิจของสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์ด้วย

ยุทธศาสตร์ - ยุทธวิธี

ยุทธศาสตร์ (เป้าหมายสูงสุด) ของเราก็คือการปฎิวัติประชาธิปไตยยกเลิกระบอบเผด็จการโบราณ ยุทธวิธีของเราก็คือการกระทำการใดๆก็ตามเพื่อที่จะนำมาซึ่งเป้าหมายที่ยุทธศาสตร์กำหนดไว้

เพชรสีน้ำเงิน

มันเป็นสิ่งที่น่าขายหน้าอย่างสูงสุดของชาติและของประชาชนไทยที่ ผู้มีบารมีของประเทศได้ขโมยเพชรสีน้ำเงินจากประเทศซาอุดิอาระเบีย เป็นผลให้คนไทยเป็นแสนๆคนไม่สามารถไปทำงานที่ประเทศเขาได้ คนไทยนับล้านต้องยากจนลงเพราะคนที่เห็นแก่ตัวเพียงคนเดียว

คนที่ไม่เห็นคุณค่าในการเลือกตั้ง ได้รับเลือกเป็น กกต.

นี่คือการต่อสู้ วันนี้มันเป็นการต่อสู้ที่จะนำไปสู่การเปลี่ยนแปลงครั้งใหญ่ของประเทศ...

มันจะเปลี่ยนแปลงโครงสร้างของสังคม มันไม่ใช่เปลี่ยนแค่รัฐบาล มันจะเปลี่ยนระบอบ... ถ้าอำนาจเก่าไม่ยอมเปลี่ยนแปลง ขัดขืน มันต้องปะทะกัน นี่มันเป็นกฎธรรมชาติ ต้องเกิดขึ้น (อ.สุรชัย ด่านวัฒนานุสรณ์, 29 ม.ค. 2557)

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

Thailand: The Calm before Another Storm?

No comments:

Post a Comment