Thailand's Misrule by Law
The judicial and military establishment are skewing the playing field in favor of the ruling party.
By THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAK
On the surface at least, Thailand has returned to the rule of law. After the government declared a state of emergency in April, the military subdued the "red shirt" protesters and restored order. And in the last three weeks, the Constitutional Court dismissed two cases against the ruling Democrat Party that could have seen the party banned from politics.
However, in both cases the government's wins came at the expense of its perceived legitimacy. Fresh questions are being raised about whether and how the military and judiciary should exercise power in a democracy. Propping up the pro-establishment status quo may well boomerang, as a backlash of popular grievances builds. The public's suppressed aspirations for reform mean that Thailand's period of tumult is not over yet.
The Constitutional Court's dismissals of the cases against the Democrats were particularly shocking because they were made on procedural grounds and in the face of strong precedents for holding the ruling party accountable. After the military coup that deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in September 2006, his immensely popular Thai Rak Thai party was disbanded for vote fraud in May 2007. A military-supported new constitution failed to prevent its offshoot People's Power Party from winning the polls in December 2007. But by December 2008, this party was also removed from office by the Constitutional Court for vote fraud.
Along the way, a pro-Thaksin prime minister was judicially disqualified for hosting a television cooking show and receiving a token honorarium, and more than 200 politicians were banned from politics for five years in connection with the various dissolutions of these two and other minor parties. The trials of these parties were expeditious and the court delivered the verdicts rapidly.
The Democrat Party, in contrast, succeeded in having two charges thrown out without a trial. The first charge, abusing state funding for political parties, involved the alleged misuse of 29 million baht ($964,000) for making campaign posters that was not properly documented with receipts. The second charge, embezzling an illegal donation, stemmed from a 258 million baht ($8.6 million) donation from the company TPI Polene, some of which disappeared. (The company says the donation was legal.) In both cases, the allegations were serious enough that, if proven, the party could have been dissolved, as happened to the pro-Thaksin parties.
A red flag against the status quo.
The court decided not to proceed with the case because the Election Commission chairman failed to follow proper procedures and time frames for filing charges against the Democrat Party. This means questions will linger whether the Democrats received preferential treatment. It won't help that as the case dragged on, several judges of the nine-member court were filmed discussing how to exonerate the Democrats. They had to recuse themselves, but the suspicion remains that the court is politicized.
The dissolution of political parties and bans on politicians on one side of Thailand's deepening divide is part of a trend in Thai politics that some have dubbed "judicialization." The courts are increasingly the final arbiter of the country's political direction. But because the courts are perceived as biased, instead of achieving reconciliation and a way forward, judicialization has exacerbated matters.
The red shirts movement, initially pro-Thaksin but increasingly beyond Mr. Thaksin's control, is likely to be further galvanized. Rallies around the country now regularly attract tens of thousands of red-shirt demonstrators. Their claims of injustice and "double standards" will intensify, and their anti-status quo resolve will harden.
Supporters of the post-coup status quo are preparing for a return to democracy, but with the playing field tilted in their favor. Following the Democrats' fraud dismissals, military authorities have hinted they will soon lift the state of emergency in the Bangkok metropolitan area. This would prepare the way for the Democrat-led coalition government to call elections in 2011.
The establishment forces' game plan is clear. Having put down Mr. Thaksin's challenge and crushed the red shirts' uprisings in April 2009 and earlier this year, the latter at a cost of 91 fatalities and 1,900 injuries, the army-backed government of Abhisit Vejjajiva is emboldened to soldier on with its own populist agenda of deficit spending on handouts and giveaways in preparation for the polls.
The Democrats are unlikely to win an outright victory, but the establishment camp can ensure they remain in power. The army is poised to pressure smaller parties to join a Democrat-led coalition, leaving out the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party.
But using the military's power to thwart the results of elections in this way will likely inspire a new outburst from the red shirts. Fragmented both in terms of organization and ideology, these activists are united only by their opposition to the redistribution of power after the coup. Their lack of a common set of objectives, in turn, feeds the paranoia of the establishment, setting up a series of confrontations down the road.
This showdown has long been building behind Thailand's calm exterior. In the first half of the last decade, Mr. Thaksin dominated the political scene. His rule may have been characterized by allegations of human rights violations, abuses of power and graft accusations, but it was also propelled by an immensely popular platform and policy innovations that upgraded Thailand's economic potential. Yet following his unseating by the military, Thailand has not been able to build a truly democratic political system capable of cleaning up the Thaksin legacy while allowing Mr. Thaksin's supporters to push for their legitimate political goals in the way voters do elsewhere.
In the protracted face-off between the establishment, fronted by Mr. Abhisit and reinforced by the judiciary, bureaucracy and army, a compromise involving reform of the way power is wielded is the only way forward. But the government and its powerful backers seem determined to prevail at all cost. They are risking an even bigger upheaval that threatens Thailand's survival as a unified state.
Mr. Thitinan is director of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.
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